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MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REDUX:
GLOBALIZATION, CORE VALUES, AND
REVIVING THE MDP DEBATE IN AMERICA
PaulD. Paton*
INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE

MDP

When in August 2000 the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates rejected the recommendations of its own Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be
amended to permit integrated multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) involving
lawyers and other professionals, it did so with a vengeance. The passage of
Resolution 1OF followed a nearly three-year investigation and rancorous
debate within the ABA. The Resolution emphatically rejected fee sharing
with nonlawyers and nonlawyer ownership and control of law firms as
"inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession" and proposed that
rules barring such alternative service delivery innovations be preserved.1
The Resolution provided a nonexhaustive list of "core values" and urged
that each jurisdiction responsible for lawyer regulation implement the
"principles" set out in the resolution, all of which would function as a
bulwark against encroachment on the traditional law firm model. 2 For all
intents and purposes, the MDP was dead, buried in "core values" rhetoric.
That rhetoric served to preserve a regime for the delivery of legal services,
* Associate Professor and Director, Ethics Across the Professions Initiative, University of
the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I acknowledge with great thanks the support of Eli
Wald and Bruce Green, Jessi Tamayo, and the editors of the Fordham Law Review,
especially Leigh Van Ostrand, for this work. I am indebted to Carole Silver for her
thoughtful commentary and to all of the participants in the Fordham Law Review
Symposium for their feedback.
Any errors or omissions, of course, remain my
responsibility.
1. AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, THE HOUSE ADOPTED REVISED
RECOMMENDATION
1OF
(2000),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdprecoml0f.html
[hereinafter Recommendation IOF].
2. Id.; see also Sydney M. Cone, III, Views on Multidisciplinary Practice with
ParticularReference to Law and Economics, New York, and North Carolina, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1, 4 (2001); L. Harold Levinson, Collaboration Between Lawyers and
Others: Coping with the ABA Model Rules After Resolution ]OF, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
133, 135-36 (2001). Contra Marc N. Biamonte, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a
Change to Model Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1161, 1164
(2001) (posing contrary view of the uncertainty left by the ABA July 2000 vote, calling the
ABA move to disband its MDP Commission "shortsighted and irresponsible"); Adam A.
Shulenburger, Would You Like Fries with That? The Future of MultidisciplinaryPractices,
87 IOWA L. REv. 327, 329 (2001).
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which, while anchored in legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest,
independence, and preserving privilege, also functioned to prevent
3
competition and to protect lawyers' turf.
But the MDP may have new life in America. In August 2009, the ABA
created its new Ethics 20/20 Commission and gave it explicit instructions to
"review lawyer ethics rules and regulation across the United States in the
context of a global legal services marketplace." 4 This means that the ABA
will need to assess how "alternative business structures" for the delivery of
legal services adopted in the intervening decade since Resolution 1OFincluding the MDP-are now functioning in other major common-law
jurisdictions, including England, Australia, and Canada. In announcing the
creation of the Commission, ABA President Carolyn Lamm signaled that
the Commission should consider how regulatory structures can enable U.S.
legal providers to compete with those in other countries while continuing to
protect the public and-again-the "core values" of the profession.5 She
subsequently signaled that MDPs6 "may well be" one of the topics of
consideration for the Commission.
Including the MDP as a topic for discussion by the Ethics 20/20
Commission is essential if the profession is to refute the contention that
"[r]egulation of the legal profession has been designed primarily by and for
7
the profession, and too often protects its concerns at the public's expense."
The Commission's challenge is to assess the lessons from the history of the
MDP debate of the late 1990s in a new international or globalized context,
particularly when both the economic realities facing the profession in the
United States and the regulation of the profession elsewhere have changed
dramatically in the decade since Resolution 1OF. As a December 2009 Law
Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) Task Force report neatly summarized,
"[t]here is now a worldwide market for legal services, driven by clients
seeking to operate globally," clients are "looking for lawyers who are
tapped in to the global market and are able to provide seamless service,"
"[t]he legal profession is facing increasing competition from other service

3. See Paul D. Paton, Competition Bureau Report: Competition, Self-Regulation and
the Challenge of Change, BRIEFLY SPEAKING (Can.), May 2008, at 15 (reviewing
COMPETITION BUREAU CAN., SELF-REGULATED PROFESSIONS-BALANCING

COMPETITION

AND
REGULATION (2007),
available at http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cbbc.nsf/vwapj/Professions%20study%2Ofinal%20E.pdf/$FILE/Professions%20study%20fina
%20E.pdf); see also Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The
Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189,
201; Press Release, Competition Bureau Can., Consumers and Economy Would Benefit

from Reduction in Regulation in Professions, a Competition Bureau Study Finds (Dec. 11,
2007), http://www.bureaudelaconcurrence.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02540.html.
4. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics
Commission To Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers
(Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/newsrelease.efn?releaseid730.
5. Id.
6. James Podgers, Off the Mat, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 65.
7. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:

PROFESSION 208 (2000).

REFORMING THE LEGAL
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providers," the "business structure of the profession is shifting," and the

"profession's ability to maintain self-regulation has been eroded." 8 Some
of the myriad challenges facing the profession as a result of globalization
are also identified in the ABA Ethics 20/20 Preliminary Issues Outline
released on November 19, 2009. As the introduction to that document
notes, "already the profession is encountering the competitive and ethical
implications of U.S. lawyers and law firms seeking to represent American
and foreign clients abroad and foreign lawyers seeking access to the U.S.
legal market"; this "increase in globalized law practice raise[s] serious
questions about whether existing ethical rules and regulatory structures
adequately address the realities and challenges of 21st Century law
practice." 9
Indeed, in confronting the issue of "alternative business structures,"
including MDPs, the Ethics 20/20 Commission notes that such structures
"raise ethical and regulatory questions for U.S. lawyers and law firms of all
sizes employed, associated, or otherwise doing business with these entities
and their clients." 10 The Issues Outline asks whether the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct need to be amended to take account of those
structures, and frames the "core values" discussion this way: "How can
core principles of client and public protection be satisfied while
simultaneously permitting U.S. lawyers and law firms to participate on a
level playing field in a global legal services marketplace that includes the
increased use of one or more forms of alternative business structures?"'1 1
Revisiting both the tenor and the substance of the MDP debates of a
decade ago is therefore both timely and necessary in order to assess various
questions: When national bar association commissions in both the United
States. and Canada in the late 1990s had recommended the adoption of rules
permitting MDPs, why did the governing bodies responsible for the
ultimate decisions so forcefully reject them? Were the recommendations
fundamentally flawed, or was the political and economic context within the
profession at the time such that domestic adoption of liberal rules was
impossible? What happened in the intervening period internationally to
change the competitive environment in which U.S. firms must now operate?
Is the search for new revenue by firms dealing with the impact of the 20082009 economic downturn, combined with the pressures of globalization,

8. THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT TO
CONVOCATION 74-75 (2009), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convdec09govemance.pdf.
9. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE

1 (2009) [hereinafter ABA ETHICS 20/20 PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE]; see also Stephen
Mayson, Global Law Firms: A Strategy Looking for a Market? 12 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished
discussion
paper), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/
documents/MaysonWebsiteArticle.pdf ("As these dynamics of globalisation and competition
play out, there are potentially significant challenges for law firms in maintaining strategic,
cultural and professional integrity.").
10. ABA ETHICS 20/20 PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE, supra note 9, at 6.
11. Id.

2196

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

sufficient to propel a different outcome if the MDP comes before the ABA
House of Delegates again? Now that England has adopted legislation
permitting alternative business structures (including the MDP) in order to
encourage competition and consumer choice in legal services provision,
how have authorities there managed to address the ethical, "core values"
challenges posed by the MDP and reconcile that with a government-driven
agenda to reform the profession in the public interest?
A review of the history of the MDP debates and developments in the
intervening period detailed below suggests that when domestic economic
interests of the profession and increased government awareness of a
consumer welfare perspective are taken into account, the "core values"
rhetoric that previously served to prevent MDP adoption will be torqued in
such a way as to open the door to other models of service delivery. Initial
steps to do so had taken place domestically in the United States in the
aftermath of the ABA August 2000 Resolution; more dramatic leaps have
taken place internationally in the intervening period, most notably in
England and Australia. The answer seems to be as blunt as the Legal
Services Board in England put it in a 2009 discussion paper: the question
of whether alternative business structures ought to be permitted is settled
and a new reality. Rather, the focus needs to be on when and how the
12
market should be opened.
Accordingly, this article dedicates its primary focus to a historical review
of the MDP debate in the United States and Canada and a summary of
changes in England and Australia that set the stage for the Ethics 20/20
reconsideration of the MDP and alternative business structures in the
United States in the face of new global realities facing the legal profession.
It attempts to frame answers to a number of the questions posed above in
order to situate what ought to happen next. The challenge thereafter-for
both the Ethics 20/20 Commission and for a subsequent paper to follow this
one-is then to dissect and assess these international developments for
clues as to what new MDP rules in the United States ought to be. For
present purposes, however, the objectives are simpler: to pore over the
entrails of prior debates and subsequent international developments for
lessons about how the MDP debate should even be engaged this time.
In Australia, the multidisciplinary practice, nonlawyer ownership, and
even public ownership of shares in law firms is a new reality. 13 Certain
12. LEGAL SERVS. BD., WIDER ACCESS, BETTER VALUE, STRONG PROTECTION:
DISCUSSION PAPER ON DEVELOPING A REGULATORY REGIME FOR ALTERNATIVE BusINEss
STRUCTURES 4 (2009).

13. See the discussion of Australian regulatory changes in Paul D. Paton, Between a
Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of Self-Regulation-CanadaBetween the United States

and the English/AustralianExperience, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 87, 104-07; Christine Parker,
Law Firms Incorporated: How IncorporationCould and Should Make Firms More Ethically

Responsible, 23 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 347 (2004) [hereinafter Parker, Law Firms Incorporated]
(discussing MDPs and ILPs in Australia); Christine Parker, Peering Over the Ethical
Precipice: Incorporation, Listing and the Ethical Responsibilities of Law Firms (Univ. of

Melbourne, Melbourne Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 339, 2008) [hereinafter
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Canadian regulations adopted after 2000 permit a modified form of MDP as
well as an "affiliated law firm" model in which law firms establish
relationships with other professional services firms for the joint marketing,
promotion, and delivery of legal and other services to clients.' 4 In England,
the 2007 Legal Services Act, which transformed and effectively ended the
self-regulation of the legal profession in that country, was the direct result
of political debate and direct government involvement.1 5 That Act provides
specific authorization for the establishment of alternative business
structures for the delivery of legal services by lawyers and nonlawyers
together.' 6 In the United States, a California State Bar Long Range
Strategic Plan in 2002 had recommended continuing assessment of the
"feasibility and ethical implications of permitting lawyers to join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice where both legal and non-legal
professional services are offered to the public."'1 7 A 2001 California State
Bar Task Force report found that a fully integrated professional services
firm would permit the "'core values' of the legal profession not only [to] be
maintained, but [to] be reaffirmed."' 8 A Demonstration Project was
proposed to translate Task Force recommendations into reality. 19 But the
MDP still does not exist in the United States in a form that would be
recognized elsewhere; in all U.S. jurisdictions except for the District of
Parker, Peering Over the Ethical Precipice], available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1132926 (analyzing the implications of the incorporation and
listing on the Australian Securities Exchange of Slater & Gordon, the "first law firm in the
world to list"); see also Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing
Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535 (2009).
14. See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of By-laws
governing multidisciplinary practices and affiliated law firms by The Law Society of Upper
Canada); see also BY-LAW No. 7, pts. III-IV (Law Soc'y of Upper Can. 2009) [hereinafter
LAW Soc'Y BY-LAW 7], available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/bylaw7.pdf; Paul D.
Paton, What Happens After "HappilyEver After "? Regulatory Resistance and Rule-Making
After Canadianand American Bar Association Resolutions on MultidisciplinaryPractice,36
U. B.C. L. REv. 259 (2003); Paul D. Paton, "In the Public Interest": Threats to SelfRegulation of the Legal Profession in Ontario, 1998-2006 (Feb. 2008) (unpublished JSD
dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the Library of Congress) (from which
portions of the historical record here have been drawn and updated).
15. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.). The history of events leading up to its
passage is canvassed in Paton, supra note 13, at 88, 96-104; see also Judith L. Maute, Bar
Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer Protection: Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J.
PROF. LAW. 53; Judith L. Maute, Revolutionary Changes to the English Legal Profession or
Much Ado About Nothing?, PROF. LAW., 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Maute, Revolutionary
Changes]; John Flood, Future Directions in the UK Legal Profession: Life After the Legal
Services Act 2007 (Apr. 17-18, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/FloodWebsitePaper.doc. For a
seminal history of the English legal profession setting the stage for these recent
developments, see RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003).

16. Legal Services Act, c. 29, pt. 5.
17. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC PLAN 11 (2002).
18. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT
AND FINDINGS ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, at vi (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE BAR OF
CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP].

19. Id. at 23.
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Columbia, firms cannot be organized
for the practice of law if nonlawyers
20
have ownership interests in them.
The changed economic reality for law firms in the United States in the
aftermath of the economic downturn of 2008-2009 and the dramatic lawyer
and staff job losses of early 2009 may mean a new imperative-self-serving
or otherwise-to reconsider whether "core values" rhetoric needs to be
viewed through a new lens and new forms of business models including the
MDP need to be permitted. 2 1 The profession is continuing to experience
"growing internal political dissension at the very moment when it also
confronts the profound and permanent external challenges of the new
economy." 22 Looking to the history of the MDP debate can therefore
provide signs not only about the way forward for legal service delivery, but
also for the profession's own conception of how its essential values and
principles can be sustained in this "brave new world."
I. THE MDP DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1998-2002
A close examination of MDP debate in North America between 1998 and
2002 reveals that despite an overt focus on "core values," the subtext was
largely about the status of lawyers in the face of various threats, particularly
competitive threats from other professionals in the commercial marketplace.
Characterized as a struggle of "epic proportions" between the legal and
accounting professions, opponents of change cast the MDP challenge as
20. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2006); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The

Death of Big Law 32-33 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
LE09-025, 2009), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467730.
21. A sampling of legal press reports of the impact of the economic downturn of 20082009 on law firms confirms the dramatic results. See Adam Cohen, With the Downturn, It's
Time To Rethink the Legal Profession,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at A26; Ross Todd, Fading
Away, Am.LAW., Aug. 2009, at 64 ("Since January 2008, Am Law 200 firms have laid off
more than 2,900 lawyers."); Debra Cassens Weiss, 2009's Toll: More Than 10,000 Law
Firm Layoffs and Lower Pay Trend, A.B.A. J., May 28, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/2009s toll more than_10000 law firm-layoffs (reporting that year to date,
3881 lawyers and 6282 law firm staff had been laid off by major U.S. law firms); see also
Martha Neil, After Early March Mayhem, Law Firm Layoffs Slow: Month's Total Nears
3,500, A.B.A.
J.,
Mar.
26,
2009,
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
march-began -with mayhem butblisteringlayoffs-pacejis slowing; Martha Neil, March
Mayhem: Law Firm Layoffs in 1 Week Total Nearly 1,500, A.B.A. J., Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/marchmayhem lawfirm layoffstop500
today_over_1200_sincefriday; Martha Neil, PartnerPay Cuts Are New Signpost in Dismal
Law
Firm
Economic
Landscape,
A.B.A.
J.,
Mar.
24,
2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/partner-pay-cuts-are-new.signpost_in-dismalla
w_firmeconomiclandscape; Posting of Brian Baxter to The Am Law Daily,
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/08/unemployment-rate-falls-but-legalsector-still-contracting.html (Aug. 7, 2009, 12:45 EST); Legal Strategy 101: It's Time for
Law Firms To Re-think Their Business Model, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Apr. 29, 2009,

http:/iknowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfn?articleid=2231 (subscription required, on
file with the Fordham Law Review). For an analysis of the impact of the 2008-2009
downturn on law firms in America beyond the companion articles in this volume, see
Ribstein, supra note 20.
22. Harry W. Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal
Profession in the New Economy, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1,48 (1996).

20L1

MUL TIDISCIPLINAR Y PRACTICE RED UX

2199

threatening the "core values" of the legal profession and successfully relied
on the rhetoric of "core values" to propel decisions in Canada against
permitting MDPs to operate in a meaningful way, and in the United States
against permitting MDPs from operating at all. 2 3 The history offers
important insights into how regulators addressed the ethics of
multidisciplinary practice, and into how they used "core values" and
"public interest" rhetoric to insulate the legal profession from external
influences in an age of increasing globalization. 24 Reliance on that rhetoric
to substantiate restrictive rules served neither the profession nor the public.
Those terms became proxies for an "antimarket, anticompetitive attitude of
the bar that impedes change in [the] rules of professional conduct. ' 5
Although the language central to the "concept of a profession may set the
practice apart as a normative ideal, . . . the structuring of the profession is
still the structuring of a market," 26 pitting the interests of the "legal
profession" against the reality of changes to "legal practice." 27 Beyond the
nuances of whether or not to adopt a more open approach to modes of legal
service delivery, the MDP debate then-as now-put directly into issue
whether legal regulators were accountable to the interests of clients and the
public, or simply their own. Significant functional change in self-regulation
of the legal profession in the United States was the direct result of careful
scrutiny over a period of nearly twenty-five years. 28 Together, the
23. Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for
Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1599 (2000); Jack Giles, Why MultiDisciplinary Practices Should Be Controlled by Lawyers, 59 ADVOCATE 695 (2000). As
noted above, Resolution 10F prevented MDPs from operating in the United States;
regulators in Ontario, Canada, adopted a form of MDP that is assessed below, but that I
characterize as "law firm plus" rather than a fully integrated multidisciplinary,
multiprofessional partnership.
24. For a detailed consideration of the rhetoric of "core values" in the context of the
multidisciplinary practice debate in the United States, see Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values:
False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2001), and Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary
Restrictions on MultidisciplinaryPractice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some
Implicationsfor the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1144-49 (2000).
25. See Crystal, supra note 24, at 748.
26. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000); see also ROBERT G. EVANS & MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST, at xi-xiii (1982); John S.

Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal
Profession: A Market Approach To Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the TwentyFirst Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to
Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over CorporateLegal
Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008).
27. Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to PrivateJustice: Legal Practice at War with
the Profession andIts Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 931 (1993).
28. A sampling of considerations of self-regulatory models and structures in the United
States during the period includes RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); Benjamin

Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers? An Economic Analysis of the Justifications
for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001); Crystal, supra note 24;
Garth, supra note 27; Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1833 (2001); James W. Jones, Future Structure
and Regulation of Law Practice: An Iconoclast'sPerspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 537 (2002);
Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology
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challenge of the economic downturn in 2008-2009, and the changed global
legal practice environment that the ABA's Ethics 20/20 Commission is
charged with assessing, mandate a similar shift
in approach and
29
reconsideration of the place of the MDP in America.
II. THE MDP DEBATE IN CONTEXT
The concept of the multidisciplinary practice, or MDP, is fairly simple:
an integrated entity that provides legal services as one of several
professional services offerings through a single firm or provider. The
Canadian Bar Association committee studying multidisciplinary practices
described MDPs as "business arrangements in which individuals with
different professional qualifications practise together in partnership or in
other business arrangements. . . . to combine different skills to provide a

Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995);
Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of ProfessionalRegulation, 55 FLA. L. REV.
977 (2003); Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273 (1998); John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer
Self-Regulation: Learningfrom Ohio's Struggle To Reform Its DisciplinarySystem, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 65 (1999); Ted Schneyer, Introduction: The Future Structure and Regulation
of Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 521 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, EmbracingDescent: The
Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal
Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad
Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659 (2002); W. Bradley Wendel,
Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999); David B.
Wilkins, Afterword: How. Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?Managing Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465
(1996); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992);
Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection:
Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False
Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002). See also more recent
considerations in JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005) (assessing

forces of transformation and change in the Chicago bar over a twenty-year period), and Fred
C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) [hereinafter
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation].
29. In addition to the other references cited below, literature during the prior debate of
particular importance includes, on multidisciplinary practice, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE:
STAYING COMPETITIVE AND ADAPTING TO CHANGE

(Gary A.

Munneke

& Ann

L.

MacNaughton eds., 2001), and in particular, NAT'L MULTIDISCIPLINARY P'SHIPS COMM.,
FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS: REPORT TO
DELEGATES (1999), reprintedin MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE: STAYING COMPETITIVE AND

ADAPTING TO CHANGE, supra, app. 3 at 145; also Gary A. Munneke, Lawyers, Accountants,
and the Battle To Own ProfessionalServices, 20 PACE L. REV. 73 (1999); on globalization of
legal services, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Jens Drolshammer &
Michael Pfeifer eds., 2001); Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal
Services-Shifting Identities,31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1093 (2000); Detlev F. Vagts, The
Impact of Globalization on the Legal Profession, 2 EUR. J.L. REFORM 403 (2000). A
remarkably prescient commentary on both globalization and multidisciplinary practice is
found in Roderick A. Macdonald, Let Our Future Not Be Behind Us: The Legal Profession
in Changing Times, 64 SASK. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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broad range of advice to consumers." 30 The MDP was different in both
conception and design from an affiliated practice or subsidiary business
(such as political consulting or lobbying) developed by a law firm that the
law firm could market to its legal and other clientele, and it represented a
new and revolutionary way of bringing legal services to the commercial
marketplace. This was not simply an abstract idea, however. The MDP
posed professional and ethical challenges in particular because of moves
during the late 1990s through to roughly 2002 by the then "Big Five"
accounting firms to provide legal services. At one stage, Big Five
accounting firm MDPs "seemed to represent an irresistible force," with
numbers of lawyers in Andersen Legal, KLegal, and Landwell (the legal
networks or firms affiliated with accounting firms Arthur Andersen,
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, respectively) in 2000 rivaling those
31
of the largest global law firms, Clifford Chance and Baker & McKenzie.
In addition to the obvious competitive threat, the fundamental issue was
control: whether lawyers could maintain their professional values and
standards in an organization controlled by nonlawyers, particularly in an
organization controlled by accounting firms.
Through the 1990s,
accounting firms had expanded into nontraditional areas of practice,
explained by the decline of audit services from the most prestigious and
profitable professional-service offering to a lower-profit, high-risk activity

30. CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, INT'L PRACTICE OF LAW COMM., STRIKING A BALANCE: THE
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE ON MULTI-DISCIPLINARY

PRACTICES AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11 (1999) [hereinafter STRIKING A BALANCE]
(citation omitted). The issue of how to define multidisciplinary practice was the subject of
considerable debate itself. The Canadian Bar Association's (CBA) August 2000 Council
Resolution 00-03-A encompassed more than the fundamentally integrated "one-stop shop"
envisioned by the looser 1999 definition. It provided that
MDPs are business arrangements in which lawyers [including Quebec notaries]
and non-lawyers practice together to provide a broad range of advice, including
legal advice, to consumers, and which encompass a variety of forms, from highly
integrated organizations with lawyers and non-lawyers working under one
ownership structure to loose referral networks.
Canadian Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-03-A (2000). The Federation of Law Societies of
Canada tabled draft Model Rules for Multi-Disciplinary Practices at its meeting on February
26, 2000, that defined MDPs as encompassing both integrated and affiliated law firm
models. Fed'n of Law Soc'ys of Can., Nat'l Multi-Disciplinary P'ships Comm., Model
Rules for MDPs-Draft (Jan. 25, 2000) (on file with the author). The Federation failed to
reach a "consensus such as would be necessary to have the federation adopt a model rule of
any form." V. RANDELL J. EARLE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MDP COMMITTEE OF THE
FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA 2000 ANNUAL MEETING, HALIFAX, NS (2000),

available at http://www.flsc.ca/en/documents/2000mdpreport.doc.
The Law Society of
Upper Canada, for example, separated the concept of the MDP from affiliation arrangements
between law firms and other providers. Other regulators have not made similar distinctions
and prefer to treat all alliances, from fully integrated firms to looser referral arrangements, as
MDPs. For ease of understanding and reference, I adopt the Canadian Bar Association's
Striking a Balance conception and definition of the MDP unless making specific reference to
other definitional choices.
31. Bryant G. Garth, MultidisciplinaryPracticeAfter Enron: Eliminating a Competitor
but Not the Competition, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 591, 592 (2004).
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that could be used as a "loss-leader" through which client connections could
32
be made to sell other, more profitable, tax and consulting services.
The opponents of change cast the issue of MDPs as threatening the "core
values" of the legal profession, the foundation upon which the legal
profession operates and by which some have argued that democracy is
protected. 33 These "core values"-maintaining independence, protecting
privilege, and avoiding conflicts of interest-became the vocabulary that
defined and hijacked the debate. Reliance on "core values" rhetoric
supported claims of critics that the profession cannot be trusted to regulate
itself in the public interest. As one critic argued at the time, such reliance
placed the profession
in the position of arguing that market forces are irrelevant to the debate
over ethics. They are not. . . .The profession would be much better
served by fostering realistic debates that take into account a full range of
values, including market values, rather than by .using the rhetoric of34core
values as a kind of veto over change in rules of professional conduct.
Regrettably, the MDP debates in the United States and Canada often
lacked those characteristics, especially the debate conducted by the legal
regulator in Ontario. The next section provides a summary overview of the
history of the MDP debate at the American Bar Association, the Canadian
Bar Association, and in two Canadian provinces and two U.S. states. The
stories are different but instructive both about process and result. The
American Bar Association (ABA)-and, to a lesser degree, the Canadian
Bar Association (CBA)-had open processes and considered a wide range
of inputs and perspectives.
Additionally, the committees for each
recommended liberalization of MDP rules, which the governing bodies of
both associations then rejected. The Law Society of Upper Canada, granted
statutory responsibility for regulating the legal profession in the province of
Ontario in the public interest, adopted processes that included little or no
direct public input and thereby excluded views that might have allowed for
better policy decisions. Good process is not a prophylactic. But inadequate
process virtually guarantees an unsound result, leaving policy making open
to the overt political manipulation with which the MDP debate in Ontario
was infused. The Law Society demonstrated a willingness to ignore its own
academic experts and the available constitutional analysis, both of which
supported a more open MDP regime than what the Law Society eventually
put in place. Further, the Law Society ignored the available economic
analysis of consumer needs to arrive at predestined policy conclusions.
Held entirely within the profession, the MDP debate in Ontario became a
direct illustration of the perils of a "professional community that is too
inward-looking, that is content to regulate itself without checks from the

32. COLIN BOYD,THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: THE HISTORY

BEHIND THE BIG 5 ACCOUNTING FIRMS DIVERSIFYING INTO LAW 13 (1999).
33. See Giles, supra note 23 (discussing the "core values" of the legal profession).
34. See Crystal, supra note 24, at 774 (footnote omitted).
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outside," prone to "pernicious norms," and resistant to change. 35 Lawyers
were content to determine what constituted the public interest and to
proceed in a fashion that was blatantly self-serving and exclusionary.
Elsewhere, process was better even if the results were essentially the same.
III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

MDP CONSIDERATIONS:

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Formal authority for governance of the legal profession in the United
States lies with state courts, which assert "inherent power" to regulate the
practice of law; 36 in Canada, responsibility rests with the provincial Law
Societies acting under statute. 37 However, the ABA and the CBA play
significant roles in developing the codes of professional conduct and
perspectives on ethics that regulators frequently adopt or are guided by to
govern the legal profession. 38 Accordingly, ABA and CBA debates were
crucial to shaping the fate of the MDP at the turn of the century.
July 2000's Resolution 1OF of the American Bar Association House of
Delegates and Canadian Bar Association Resolutions 00-03-A and 01-01-M
from August 2000 and February 2001 on MDPs were touchstones for the
broader debate. After more than two years of deep investigation by its own
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, the ABA House of Delegates in
August 2000 not only rejected the Commission's recommendations to
permit integrated multidisciplinary practices involving lawyers and other
professionals, but also struck back with a resolution that disbanded the
Commission and left the ABA without any draft model rules to deal with
the reality of MDPs in the United States.
Resolution 10F rejected fee sharing with nonlawyers and nonlawyer
ownership and control of law firms as "inconsistent with the core values of
the legal profession" and proposed rules that prevented the preservation of
such innovations. 39 The Resolution provided a nonexhaustive list of "core
values" of the legal profession. 40 State bars, however, would have to strike
out on their own and find appropriate models
for themselves, thereby
41
risking the prospect of a patchwork response.
35. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
ProfessionalCommunities, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1955, 1953 (2001) (abstract).

36. See the discussion in RHODE, supra note 7, at 144-47, and Zacharias, The Myth of
Self-Regulation, supra note 28, at 1147-48.
37. See, e.g., Law Society Act, R.S.O., ch. L 8 (1990) (Can.).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at ix-x (2009); About the Canadian Bar
Association, http://www.cba.org/CBA/about/main/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010); CBA Code
of Professional Conduct, http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2010).
39. Levinson, supra note 2, at 135.
40. Id. at 135-36.
41. Id. at 143-44. Harold Levinson, an advisor to the New York State Bar Association

Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation in 1999-2000, did
not see the resolution as particularly problematic in this regard. This perhaps reflected his
confidence that the New York model set out in that state bar's committee report provided the
answers other state bars required.
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After the Canadian Bar Association's International Practice of Law
Committee initially rejected the MDP in an interim report, it and the CBA
as a whole dramatically reversed course. In August 2000, CBA Council
approved a "final" August 2000 resolution 4 2 that, in contrast to the ABA
resolution adopted only a few weeks earlier, permitted lawyers to engage in
"business arrangements in which individuals with different professional
qualifications practise together .... to combine different skills to provide a
broad range of advice to consumers." 43 In a further stark reversal, however,
the CBA Council subsequently "clarified" the resolution in February 2001
with a further resolution that so restricted the arrangements approved six
months earlier that their essence was lost and the preresolution status quo
retrenched. 44 The CBA model was rendered useless for provincial
regulators seeking an example of how they might implement change.
The merits and drawbacks of MDPs and the policy options available to
regulators had been canvassed extensively elsewhere in anticipation of
decisions by regulators about what to do. 4 5 Despite the resounding defeat at
the ABA and the muted one at the CBA, the manner in which both ABA
42. Canadian Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-03-A (2000).
43. STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 30, at 11.
44. Canadian Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-01-M (2000) (Multi-Disciplinary Practices).
45. For a Canadian perspective, see, for example, Kent Roach & Edward M. Jacobucci,
MultidisciplinaryPracticesand Partnerships: Prospects, Problems and Policy Options, 79
CANADIAN B. REv. 1, 5 (2000) (arguing that consumers will benefit from a liberal regime of
MDP governance, but striking a cautionary note: "Whatever regulatory response is taken
must be justified in the public interest as necessary to protect the consumers of legal services
and the ethical canons of the legal profession. There is a significant danger, however, that
regulators will be pressured to act in a protectionist manner."); see also Julius Melnitzer,
Here Come the Bean-Counters . . . A Primer on Multidisciplinary Practice, Part One,
CANADIAN L., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 34. For perspectives in an American context see, for
example, Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks andRewards of Purchasing
Legal Services from Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership,13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
217 (2000) [hereinafter Daly, Choosing] (describing the activities of the ABA Commission
on Multidisciplinary Practice); Mary C. Daly, What the MDP Debate Can Teach Us About
Law Practice in the New Millennium and the Need for Curricular Reform, 50 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 521 (2000) [hereinafter Daly, New Millennium] (drawing on Daly's experience as a
reporter for the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice); Dzienkowski and Peroni,
supra note 26; Phoebe A. Haddon, The MDP Controversy: What Legal Educators Should
Know, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504 (2000); Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers To
Participatein MultidisciplinaryPractices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession
as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1315 (2000); Michael W. Price, A New Millennium's
Resolution: The ABA Continues Its Regrettable Ban on Multidisciplinary Practice, 37
Hous. L. REv. 1495 (2000); Stuart S. Prince, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA 's Misguided
Quash of the MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 245 (2000); George Steven Swan, The
Political Economy of Interprofessional Imperialism: The Bar and Multidisciplinary
Practice, 1999-2001, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 151 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primeron MDPs:
Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 869 (1999); Edieth Y. Wu,
Why Say No to Multidisciplinary Practice?, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 545 (2001). For
discussions after the ABA House of Delegates July 2000 vote, see also Julia J. Hall,
Resolving the MDP Issue: Deciding If the Status Quo Is What's Best for the Client, 52
MERCER L. REv. 1191 (2001); Burnele V. Powell, Looking Ahead to the Alpha Jurisdiction:
Some Considerations That the FirstMDP JurisdictionWill Want To Think About, 36 WAKE
FORESTL. REv. 101 (2001).
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and CBA debates ended meant that the fundamental questions about MDPs
in North America were never resolved. The challenge of how best to
respond to client demand for a more integrated approach to the delivery of
professional services thus remains open. Both demand-side and supply-side
perspectives are important.
From a demand-side perspective, Professor Michael Trebilcock's
comprehensive 1999 empirical study substantiated claims that international
client demand for MDPs existed and that consumers were willing to
46
experiment with using an MDP option for legal services needs.
Trebilcock's economic analysis of MDPs showed that an integrated
approach to providing professional services might reduce costs and enhance
service quality and accessibility for clients, especially those doing business
across borders. Clients surveyed for purposes of the study identified
freedom of choice in professional services providers as extremely
important. Trebilcock analyzed key objections to MDPs raised by the bar
and legal regulators, anchored in concerns over privilege protection,
independence, and conflicts of interest, and concluded that these had been
overstated. The study further concluded that structures reflecting these
overstated concerns-notably rules permitting MDPs only if they were
controlled by lawyers and provided legal services as their primary
function-were unresponsive to a consumer welfare perspective.
On the supply side, it was clear that law firms and others would continue
with efforts to expand multidimensional professional services offerings, just
as they had already done with ownership of affiliated lobbying and
government relations firms. Mary Daly, who served as the reporter for the
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, argued that it would be a
mistake to assume that resolutions rejecting MDPs would "derail the
entrepreneurial engine that drives the U.S. legal profession. The growth of
ancillary businesses is proof positive that lawyers who want to join forces
with nonlawyers will find ways to do so." 47 Indeed, as the reviving of the
MDP debate itself now proves, banning MDP structures outright only
sidestepped for the time being the substantive question of how professionals
might deliver the best and most complete advice to their clients while
maintaining professional identity and integrity. In that respect, regulators
and bar associations in North America had missed the point: "The real

46. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & LILLA CSORGO, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES:
A CONSUMER WELFARE PERSPECTIVE (1999).
I was involved in the

commissioning of this study, its editing and release, and I adopt its analysis. See also
Michael Trebilcock & Lilla Csorgo, Multi-DisciplinaryProfessionalPractices: A Consumer
Welfare Perspective, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 1 (2001).
47. Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative
Perspective on the Future of MultidisciplinaryPartnerships in the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom After the DisintegrationofAndersen Legal, 80 WASH. U.

L.Q. 589, 645-46 (2002).
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issue isn't as much the structure of the firm(s) that are giving advice[,] but
'4 8
the nature of the advice itself."
That lesson became especially clear in the assessments of the failure of
Enron Corporation in late 2001. Fears of large-scale-takeovers of major law
firms by Big Five accounting firms had been lurking in the shadows of the
MDP debates of the late 1990s; the collapse of Enron and the subsequent
implosion of Arthur Andersen in its aftermath eliminated any realistic
prospect that such takeovers or mergers would be viable. 49 A simplistic
view of the Enron story might have been used to vindicate the positions of
both the CBA and the ABA, as proof that combining legal services with
others offered by an accounting firm would only serve to compromise the
independence of the legal advice. 50 Liberalized conflict of interest rules
used by accounting firms were cited as undermining the integrity of the
audit process at Enron, which led to a loss of integrity in the financial
statements provided to the market and a collapse of investor confidence.
Fundamental reform of auditor independence rules followed. 5 1
If
accounting firms were willing to sacrifice audit integrity in order to secure
more lucrative consulting arrangements, the argument went, then certainly
lawyers working for MDPs controlled by accountants would be pressured to
compromise their integrity and independence for financial gain.
Such a position, however, fails to acknowledge one hard truth: Enron
resulted from the improper behavior of many professionals, including
lawyers, acting in separate accounting or law firms rather than from an
inherent flaw in multidisciplinary practice arrangements. 52 Rather than
48. Nancy B. Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In Re Enron: Should the
Debateon MDP Change at All?, 65 TEX. B.J. 446, 447 (2002).
49. The
term "Big
Five"
accounting
firms includes
the firms
of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and Arthur Andersen.
Arthur Andersen remained in existence after the collapse of Enron, but only as a shell of its
former self. The firm imploded in early 2002, even prior to its June 2002 conviction on
criminal charges brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against it for obstructing justice
in the Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation of Enron. See United States v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870 (S.D. Tex. May 24,
2002). During the period under discussion, however, all five accounting firms were actively
engaged in or were pursuing the development of legal services and regulatory discussions
and the use of "Big Five" remains historically accurate. For the period after mid-June 2002,
the term "Big Four" is used herein to refer to the activities of the major accounting firms. See
also George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social History: A
Systematic Analysis of Inter-professionalCompetition, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 849 (2006).
50. See Ward Bower, MDP Isn't the Problem, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A21.
51. See Paul D. Paton, Rethinking the Role of the Auditor: Resolving the Audit/Tax
Services Debate, 32 QUEEN'S L.J. 135, 135 (2006); Strengthening the Commission's
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,265, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642,
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,915, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2103,
68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003).
52. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 9 (2002) (discussing lawyer roles in the Enron failure and the need for structural
reform of lawyer regulation to address the problems exposed); see also Roger C. Cramton,
Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primeron Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143,
162-67 (2002); Kurt Eichenwald, The FindingsAgainst Enron: Many Avenues Are Seen for
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pointing to Enron as justification for banning MDPs, regulators and others
should instead consider how best to structure incentives for the ethical
behavior of lawyers and others within all professional services firms,
whatever the configuration of the firm. Simply banning outright a business
model for delivering legal and other professional services fails to address
the more complex questions of how best to reward independent, ethical, and
candid advice, regardless of the conduit through which that advice is
delivered.
A. The American Bar Association
The history of the ABA's consideration of the MDP issue has been
canvassed extensively. 53 However, a review and synopsis is appropriate
and helpful in understanding the process/substance dichotomy in evidence
in that debate in order to prepare for the MDP debate that I have suggested
the Ethics 20/20 Commission ought to engage in, in view of both changed
economic circumstances and developments in the global legal marketplace.
In 1998, ABA President Philip Anderson appointed a twelve-person
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to "determine what changes, if
any, should be made to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct with
' 54
respect to the delivery of legal services by professional services firmS."
The Commission adopted an "'open and deliberative process"' and
established an interactive website in which it posted its own reports,
requests for comments, submissions from third parties, and submissions and
presentations made at the town-hall style meetings it held between 1998 and
early 2000. 55 The website was cited as providing "immeasurable" value,
and "contributed enormously to the public's and the bar's perception of the
Criminal Investigators, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at Cl; Mike France, What About the
Lawyers?, Bus. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58; Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?,
FORBES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 58; Otis Bilodeau, In a Harsh Light: Report on Enron Puts
Spotlight on Lawyers Who Put Together Sales Deals That Seem Really To Be Loans,
BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Oct. 1, 2002, 2002 WLNR 15016322 (Westlaw) (highlighting
that later revelations brought lawyer conduct increasing attention). Civil lawsuits in Texas
with respect to the liability of Vinson & Elkins LLP alleged civil conspiracy and fraudulent
conduct by the law firm. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 31-36, In re Enron Corp.
Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (No. H-01-3624).
53. In addition to authorities noted supra notes 2, 24, 29, and 31, see also Daly, New
Millennium, supra note 45. For a law and economics analysis of consumer welfare issues in
the MDP debate in the U.S., see Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 26; Daniel R. Fischel,
Multidisciplinary Practice,55 Bus. LAW. 951 (2000); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran,
The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the
Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 775 (2001).
Contra David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 839, 839 (1999)
(suggesting that the law and economics analysis is misguided, and arguing instead that in
considering the MDP issue, "[t]he right question is not whether new roles with no rules are
good for lawyers and clients, but rather whether they are good for the rest of us").
54. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report of the Commission on
MultidisciplinaryPracticeto the ABA House ofDelegates, PROF. LAW., Spring 1999, at 1, 1.
55. Harris & Foran, supra note 53, at 785 (quoting Dzienkowski and Peroni, supra note
26, at 129).
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transparency of the commission's process. '5 6 As one observer noted,
"Without this transparency, it is likely that the commission's
recommendations would have been criticized as 'hidden agendas,'
'tradeoffs,' and 'sellouts.' The open hearings and the Web site enabled
interested parties to better understand the raw, unfiltered process of the
commission's thoughts as they unfolded. '5 7 The Commission heard over
sixty hours of testimony from fifty-six witnesses from a variety of groups
around the world through public hearings in 1998 and 1999. Further
hearings took place in February 2000. Witnesses included consumer
advocates, partners in accounting firms, law professors, chairs of ABA
sections and committees, domestic and foreign lawyers, and others.
In
mid- 1999,
the ABA
Commission
made
revolutionary
recommendations that the Model Rules be amended to permit
multidisciplinary practice, with safeguards to protect the "core values" of
the legal profession. 58 The recommendations would have permitted
lawyers to partner with nonlawyers to provide legal services, to share legal
fees with nonlawyers, and to share ownership interests in the MDP
structure, subject to certain conditions, including an annual certification and
the requirement of an undertaking to a court in each jurisdiction from the
MDP that it would not allow interference "with a lawyer's exercise of
independent professional judgment" and would "respect the unique role of
the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal system, a representative of
clients and a public citizen." 59
After considerable debate in August 1999, the ABA House of Delegates
deferred the issue for "additional study" via the following resolution:
Resolved, that the American Bar Association make no change ... to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct [that] permit[s] a lawyer to offer
legal services through a Multidisciplinary Practice unless and until
additional study demonstrates that such changes will further the public
interest 60without. . . compromising lawyer independence and... loyalty to
clients.
In December 1999, the Commission released its Updated Background
and Informational Report and Request for Comments.6 1 The Report
56. Daly, New Millennium, supra note 45, at 529.
57. Id.
58. David Segal, Rules May Shake Law Industry: ABA To Break Accounting Barrier,

WASH. POST, June 4, 1999, at El.
59. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 54, at 7 (Draft
Resolution, paras. 14(A), (E)).
60. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FLORIDA BAR REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 2 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daly, Choosing, supra

note 45, at 280 & n.263 (cautioning that "interpret[ing] the 1999 vote as a setback for MDPs
..would be too cavalier," particularly given that it paralleled developments then underway
outside the United States). Contra Harris & Foran, supra note 53, at 786 (considering the
vote to be ominous).
61. AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE, UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND REQUEST FOR

COMMENTS (1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/febmdp.html.
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rejected the claim that there was no empirical evidence of demand for
multidisciplinary services. This accorded with the testimony before the
Commission from consumer groups, business clients, and others, whose
"support for change created an unusual alliance among disparate groups. ' 62
They "uniformly contended that the entry of a new, alternative provider of
legal services was in the best interest of the public. ' 63 Support for change
from solo practitioners and small firms was great, with the Council of the
ABA General Practice, Solo, and Small Firm Section urging that the rules
barring MDPs be relaxed. 64 All of the consumers of legal services who
voiced their opinions to the Commission-from Fortune 500 companies to
consumer representatives-urged the ABA Commission to change the rules
to permit MDPs. Thus, if discussion about "core values" of the legal
profession is intended to protect client interests, it is curious that no user of
legal services stepped forward to oppose MDPs.
Notwithstanding this overwhelmingly positive response from clients and
the public, in July 2000, the ABA House of Delegates rejected a watereddown version of the July 1999 recommendation presented by the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. This 2000 proposal made it
clear that passive investment in MDPs was not authorized and permitted
fee-sharing only if "lawyers [had] the control and authority necessary to
assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services. '65
The proposal never made it to the floor of the House of Delegates. The
Colorado and Denver bars filed a deferral motion that would have seen the
ABA postpone a decision until more state and local bars had completed
their investigations into the issue. This proposal was backed by Sherwin
Simmons, chair of the ABA Commission on MDPs, who was reported as
noting that "25 states-representing more than 50% of the US Bar-had yet
to respond formally on the MDP question" before the vote on MDPs. 66
Instead, the ABA House of Delegates voted 314 to 106 in favor of a
proposal sponsored by Robert MacCrate, former ABA President and chair
of the New York State Bar's Committee on the Law Governing Firm
Structure and Operation, and backed by the Illinois State Bar, the New
York State Bar, and the New Jersey State Bar as a "comprehensive response
to the issue of multidisciplinary practice" 67 that effectively rejected MDPs.
62. Daly, Choosing, supra note 45, at 275.
63. Id.
64. Id. Daly notes in her review that this support from small firms was consistent with
the survey information provided by the Law Society of Upper Canada, noted above, though
she does not go on to note that the Law Society of Upper Canada ignored its own evidence in
this regard. Id. at 276.
65. AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 183
(2000).
66. Sue Allen, ABA Votes To Retain Ban on MDPs, GAZETTE (U.K.), July 13, 2000, at 8;
see also Robert R. Keatinge, Colorado and Denver in the House: MDP DeclaredHeresy by
the ABA House of Delegates, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2000, at 48; John Gibeaut, 'It's A Done
Deal': House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chancesfor MDP, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92.

67. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof I Responsibility, Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice,
Transcript
of House
of Delegates
Annual
Meeting
(July
11,
2000),
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The recommendation was anchored in the language of "preserv[ing] the
core values of the legal profession" and encouraged state bar associations
and other agencies to prohibit lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers
and to retain and enforce laws that generally bar the practice of law by
"entities other than law firms. ' 68 It called upon the ABA to recommend
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to "assure that
there are safeguards" relating to "contractual relationships with nonlegal
69
professional services providers" consistent with the principles adopted.
Remarkably, especially given that the ABA supported further study by the
ABA Ethics Committee of an earlier recommendation from New York that
would permit side-by-side arrangements, the House of Delegates voted to
disband the Commission on MDPs. The text of the note attached to
Recommendation 10F stated that "[t]he Commission [on MDPs] deserves
our heartfelt thanks, but with the adoption of a comprehensive response to
multidisciplinary practice contained in the Recommendation, the work of
the Commission will be completed. ' 70 The entire debate and vote took less
71
than an hour.
Responses were swift. One delegate described the ABA House of
Delegates as "acting more like a lynch mob than a deliberative body of
professionals. '72 The end result of the ABA's deliberations reflected the
profession's self-interest rather than the public interest. As one delegate
described it:
In the discussion in the ABA meeting in New York,... the focus was
almost entirely on how MDP will affect lawyers, their practice, their
integrity, and their grip on the provision of legal services. There was
almost no consideration [of] how limitations of the provision of legal
services would affect clients and their needs.... [T]he House has chosen
to [turn] the legal profession into a protected guild ....73
This view of the final outcome accorded with an earlier outside
assessment of the anticompetitive nature of the ABA's MDP initiative. In
February 2000, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) released a
monograph entitled Converging ProfessionalServices: Lawyers Against
the Multidisciplinary Tide.74 The monograph called the earlier ABA
recommendation (which would have permitted MDPs, but only those
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpjhod-transc.html; AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT 1OF (2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdp-report 1Of.html
[hereinafter ABA, REPORT 1OF].
68. Recommendation IOF, supra note 1.
69. Id.; see also Allen, supra note 66; Wendy Davis, ABA Emphatically Rejects MDPs,
NAT'L L.J., Jul. 24, 2000, at A5; Jean Eaglesham, Courting Conflict, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 13, 2000, at 22.
70. ABA, REPORT IOF, supra note 67.
71. Gibeaut, supra note 66, at 93.
72. Keatinge, supra note 66, at 48.
73. Id.
74. Press Release, Am. Antitrust Inst., AAI Says Legal Profession's Recommendation
on Multidisciplinary Practices May Violate Antitrust Laws (Feb. 8, 2000),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/52.ashx.
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controlled by lawyers) "nothing more than an effort to protect lawyers and
law firms from competition" and asserted that the proposal in its form at the
time "should not survive antitrust scrutiny." 75 The president of the AAI
urged the MDP Commission to "produce a final proposal that better meets
the needs of consumers." 76 As will be described below, it was pressure
from England's government antitrust office that propelled legislative reform
that both effectively ended self-regulation of the legal profession and
coincidentally opened the legal services market in that country to
"alternative business structures," including the MDP.
B. The CanadianBar Association
The Canadian Bar Association is a professional, largely voluntary
organization that represents roughly two-thirds of all practicing lawyers in
Canada. The CBA's primary purpose is to promote the interests of its
members. It also seeks to "improve the administration of justice";
"improve and promote the knowledge, skills, ethical standards and wellbeing of members of the legal profession"; "promote equality in the legal
profession"; and represent the legal profession in Canada. 77 However, it is
viewed as an "important and objective voice on issues of significance to
both the legal profession and the public" '78 and is generally respected by
government for its input, although its resolutions are not binding on
79
government or any legal regulator.
Accordingly, the CBA's examination of the MDP issue is relevant as a
counterpoint to the views and actions of the legal regulators charged with
the responsibility of acting in the public interest. It is also a way to discern
the opinion of the body representative of the profession as a whole in
Canada on the MDP issue. The process by which it arrived at its final
position on the MDP question, involving political intrigue and overt
manipulation by representatives of the provincial regulator in the province
of Ontario, the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC), is also instructive.
In short, when it became clear that the Ontario regulator would be
embarrassed by having the Canadian Bar Association sanction a far more
liberal regime for MDPs than the one that LSUC had already imposed while
purportedly acting "in the public interest," LSUC representatives embarked
on an ultimately successful campaign through the legal press and at the
CBA itself to have the will of the CBA national council reversed and a
narrower MDP regime with a lawyer-control requirement adopted.

75. Id.; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 26, at 94.
76. Press Release, Am. Antitrust Inst., supra note 74.
77. Canadian Bar Ass'n, About the Canadian Bar Association, http://www.cba.org/
CBA/Info/Main (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).

78. Id.
79. Full disclosure: I am a member of the CBA and in 2009-2010 Chair of the CBA
Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee.
The views expressed herein are,
however, my own.
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The Canadian Bar Association established its International Practice of
Law (IPL) Committee in 1997 with a mandate to monitor the "activities,
negotiations and developments regarding the globalization of legal practice
and the trend towards multi-disciplinary practices through NAFTA, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Bar Association
(IBA)." 8 0 The CBA directed the IPL Committee to report to the CBA's
senior officers regularly on such developments. The IPL Committee
released an interim report to the CBA Council in 1998 that recommended to
the provincial bars that "MDPs should not be permitted to provide legal
services to clients" unless the MDP organization were controlled by
lawyers. 81 The report expressed concern that the "core values of
solicitor/client privilege and the avoidance of conflict of interest [could not]
be adequately addressed unless MDPs [were] controlled by lawyers and
primarily offer[ed] legal services." 2 The report also recommended that "to
avoid any confusion in the public mind as to the kinds of services offered
by an entity, the rules [of practice] should be changed to prohibit any MDP
or law firm from offering legal services under a name substantially similar
83
to the name of an entity not authorized to provide legal services."
The report also expressed the view that any regulatory approach to MDPs
that rendered legal services must reflect "a commitment to: (i) the
independence of lawyers and the legal profession; (ii) the preservation of
solicitor/client privilege and client confidences; (iii) the prohibition against
conflicts of interest in the practise of law; and (iv) adherence to the Code of
Professional Ethics of the legal profession .... "84 It suggested that "[o]nly
if a regulatory regime relating to MDPs [could] demonstrably satisfy these
criteria should MDPs be permitted to render legal services. '85 Similarly,
"[n]o regime relating to MDPs should be permitted if it could reasonably
jeopardize" privilege or client confidentiality. 86 Finally, the report said that
MDPs should be permitted so long as the MDP always had a majority of
owners who were lawyers and the MDP was lawyer-controlled; "the
primary activity of the MDP [was] the provision of legal services"; "all
owners of the MDP offering legal services [were made] subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Law Society of the Province in which they
practi[ced];" and "all owners of MDPs [were] required to protect the
'8 7
privilege and confidentiality of the MDP's clients.
After further study and consultations, the IPL Committee in August 1999
released its astonishing reversal of views in a report entitled Striking a

80. CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, SPECIAL COMM. ON THE INT'L PRACTICE OF LAW, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: AN INTERIM REPORT, at i (1998).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
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Balance.88 That report recommended that lawyers be allowed to participate
in MDPs even if such MDPs were not controlled by lawyers. The IPL
Committee also recommended that law societies not limit the services that
MDPs provide to those of a legal nature. It also favored a regime that
focused regulation on individual lawyers rather than on the MDPs
themselves and took the position that "[1]awyers in MDPs must be subject
to the rules of professional conduct of law societies and remain responsible
for ensuring that the services [that] they deliver comply with all such
requirements." 89 Both key elements of the new recommendation were
embarrassing to the Law Society of Upper Canada, which in May 1999 had
already imposed a regime for the province of Ontario that regulated the
MDP structure and restricted lawyer participation to those MDPs in which
legal services were the primary service offering.
The ramifications of the CBA position on the Ontario approach went
deeper. The report suggested that the adoption of a more restrictive regime
contradicted what the IPL Committee saw as more important public
interests and values. The "balance" referred to in the report's title should be
struck between "two sets of public interests" in determining the appropriate
approach to regulating MDPs:
MDPs ...may threaten ... core values of the legal profession: selfgovernance . . . , independence . . . , avoidance of conflicts of interest,
preservation of client confidentiality, preservation of solicitor-client
privilege and avoidance of the unauthorized practice of law. To preserve
these values, there are three main approaches to regulation: first, regulate
individual lawyers only and not the MDP as a business entity; second,
regulate the business entity, specifying who can control it and the types of
services [that] it can provide; third, permit MDPs generally but address
specific issues that may be of particular concern.
The choice of approach is informed by two sets of conflicting public
interests. The first is the preservation of lawyers' role in the
administration of justice. This tends to favour the separation of the
delivery of legal services from the delivery of other professional services
and is consistent with the second approach above. The second set of
public interests is based on freedom of choice, freedom of association,
competition and efficiency. This argues for substantial departures from
current business structures in which legal services are delivered and is
consistent with the first approach above. The third approach above
attempts to strike a balance between the two sets of public interests, but it
is difficult to determine how that balance should be struck.
The Committee prefers the third approach. Choice, competition and
freedom of association are aspects of the public interest that should be
given more weight. At the same time, the Committee is not persuaded
that the core values of the legal profession can be protected only by
lawyers controlling MDPs or by MDPs only delivering legal services.
30.
89. Press Release, Canadian Bar Ass'n, CBA Releases Report on Lawyers' Involvement
in Multi-Disciplinary Practices (Aug. 21, 1999).
88. STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note

2214

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

The focus should 90be on regulation of individual lawyers and not the
MDPs themselves.
The vote on the Striking a Balance recommendations came in August
2000 at the CBA Annual General Meeting in Halifax. The new CBA
president, Eugene Meehan, had vowed in September 1999 to guard lawyers
against "'know-nothing document-preparers.' and invoked democracy as a
fundamental reason to oppose MDPs. 9 1 Questioning how a law firm owned
by an accounting firm could remain independent, Meehan said, "'Without
an independent bar, and without an independent judiciary, you do not have
' 92
a democracy. It's that simple, and it's that important too.'
After a two-day debate at the August 2000 CBA Annual General
Meeting, and despite Meehan's resistance, the CBA passed a landmark
resolution on MDPs that was a stark contrast to Resolution 1OF passed by
the ABA the previous month. The CBA resolution recommended that
provincial regulators adopt rules to permit lawyers to join MDPs and share
fees with nonlawyers, but it did so without any requirement that lawyers
have financial or voting control of the MDPs themselves. The resolution
maintained, however, that lawyers would have to control the delivery of
legal services by the MDP. Lawyers would not be able to practice in an
MDP with other service providers that had conflicting ethical
responsibilities (preventing, for example, the MDP from providing audit
and legal services to the same client). MDPs would have to obtain a license
from the appropriate law society, a condition of which would be the MDP's
pledge to adhere to the "core values, ethical obligations, standards and rules
93
of professional conduct of the legal profession."
The Council passed the resolution over strenuous objections from its
Ontario branch. The Ontario delegates attempted to amend the CBA
resolution to require lawyer control of the entire MDP-something upon
which LSUC adamantly insisted, despite the fact that this would effectively
gut the Striking a Balance report. The debate ended with a process fight by
94
Ontario delegates about when the vote was supposed to have been taken.
A motion to reopen debate was defeated, forty-four to thirty-six. 95 This
outcome prompted an effort by the head of LSUC to undercut and discredit
the CBA entirely. The legal press reported it this way:
"It [the CBA resolution] certainly won't persuade the Law Society of
Upper Canada to change its view, I can tell you that," LSUC Treasurer
Robert Armstrong angrily told The Lawyers Weekly, minutes after the

90. STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 30, at 5.
91. Monique Conrad, Canadian Bar Association, CANADIAN LAW., Sept. 1999, at 10

(quoting Eugene Meehan).
92. Id. (quoting Eugene Meehan).
93. Canadian Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-03-A, § 3 (2000).
94. Cristin Schmitz, CBA Wants Law Societies To Let Lawyers Join MDPs, LAW. WKLY.
(Can.), Sept. 1, 2000, available at TLWN (Lexis); see also Michael Fitz-James, Lawyers
Don'tHave To ControlMDPs, LAW TIMEs (Can.), Aug. 28, 2000, at 1.

95. Schmitz, supra note 94.
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vote. "At the end of the day law societies96have the final say. [The CBA's
resolution] is just a statement of policy."
Armstrong increased the stakes by resigning from the CBA in protest.
Some suggested that Armstrong's resignation would "undermine[] the
CBA's claims to speak for the Canadian legal profession" 97 and that the
tactic of a very public resignation had to be seen as a political move to
discredit an outcome that undercut the authority of the Law Society of
Upper Canada's position. The debate was not yet over.
In February 2001, CBA Council passed a resolution that "clarified" and
amended the August 2000 resolution to require lawyers to have "effective
control" over the entire MDP. 9 8 "Effective control" would ensure that the
business and practice of the MDP would be in "continuing compliance with
the core values, ethical and statutory obligations, standards and rules of
professional conduct of the legal profession." 9 9 Every client of the MDP
would be considered to be the client of every lawyer in the MDP, thereby
imposing the lawyers' conflict rules on the entire MDP as though it were no
different from any one law firm. The resolution required that such control
must be via "a partnership agreement or other contractual arrangement
[that] govern[ed] the relationship of the lawyer(s) and the non-lawyer(s)
within the MDP." 10 0 Further, the MDP contract would have to stipulate
that no service provider with conflicting ethical responsibilities could offer
services to the firm's clients incompatible with lawyers' obligations to
clients.10 1 The alteration on lawyer control brought the CBA much closer
to the restrictive approach of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 10 2 and
constituted vindication for Armstrong, LSUC's head. How the CBA's new
approach reflected the public interest concerns laid out in the Striking a
Balance report was never addressed.
Given the mandate of the CBA to serve in the best interests of its lawyer
members, it would have been plausible for the CBA to have arrived at its
original position and stayed there. The force of the Striking a Balance
report had been similar to the strong recommendations of the ABA
Commission on MDPs. For a short period, the profession determined that
the public interest was more broadly defined than the self-interest of the
profession, and for a time adopted a position that the appropriate approach
to the MDP question was to have a regulatory model that did not require
either lawyer control or a singular focus on the delivery of legal services.
The tale of the reversals, however, speaks to the overt politicization of the
96. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Robert Armstrong).
97. Eric Atkins, LSUC TreasurerRobert Armstrong Quits CBA over Voting Procedure,
LAW. WKLY. (Can.), Sept. 8, 2000, availableat TLWN (Lexis).
98. Canadian Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-01-M, para. L.a (2000).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Press Release, Canadian Bar Ass'n, CBA Resolution Says Business of
MDPs Should Be Controlled by Lawyers (Feb. 19, 2001).
102. See Mid-Winter 2001, CBA Council: MDPs: A New Approach, NATIONAL (Can.),
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 54, 54.
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CBA process, particularly by the Ontario lawyers and the Law Society of
Upper Canada, which led to mixing the role of the legal regulator acting
under statutory authority "in the public interest" with the machinations of
the professional association for all lawyers in Canada.
Before returning to briefly consider state bar action following the ABA's
MDP vote, a review of the Law Society of Upper Canada and Law Society
of British Columbia MDP debates will provide a more complete picture of
how the process unfolded in Canada. In so doing, it becomes clearer how
the self-serving interest of the profession was in evidence during the period,
cloaked in "core values" and "public interest" rhetoric.
IV. THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA: LAWYER INTEREST AS PUBLIC
INTEREST

Under amendments made to the Law Society Act in 1998, the Ontario
provincial government granted the Law Society of Upper Canada power to
03
make bylaws to govern MDPs involving lawyers and other professionals. 1
Specifically, the Law Society was given authority to pass rules that
governed
the practice of law by any person, partnership, corporation or other
organization that also practises another profession, including requiring the
licensing of those persons partnerships, corporations and other
organizations, governing the issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation
of licences and
governing the terms and conditions that may be imposed
104
on licences.

No similar language appears in statutes that govern other professions in any
form of professional association with lawyers. The legislative scheme thus
clearly privileged the Law Society's ability to regulate MDPs.
The work of the Law Society of Upper Canada on MDPs had in fact
begun on April 4, 1997, when its governing body, Convocation, approved
the creation of the "Futures Task Force" in response to deliberations within
two separate Law Society committees on the need to assess the regulation
of its members. As such, the Task Force was born of a broad set of
interests in the future of the legal profession, in how the Law Society
regulated legal-services marketplace issues, and curiously in the economic
circumstances of lawyers.' 0 5 With this focus on the profession and the
well-being of its members, then, it is not surprising that a singular focus on
protecting lawyers' interests (equating that with the interests of the public)
would emerge. The ultimate scheme for regulating MDPs in Ontario is
comprised of two Law Society bylaws, one on integrated partnership
103. An Act to Amend the Law Society Act, 1998 S.O., ch. 21 (Can.).
104. Id. ch. 21, art. 29(1) (amending Law Society Act, R.S.O., ch. L. 8, § 62(0.1)32
(1990)).
105. THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., WORKING GROUP ON MULTI-DIsCIPLINE
PARTNERSHIPS, REPORT TO CONVOCATION, THE "FUTURES" TASK FORCE-FINAL REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON MULTI-DIsCIPLINE PARTNERSHIPS, at Mandate, para. 1 (1998)

[hereinafter FUTURES TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT].

2010]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REDUX

2217

arrangements and the other on affiliation arrangements between law firms
and other services providers.
A. By-Law 25: "Multi-DisciplinePractices"
By-Law 25, entitled Multi-DisciplinePractices,was adopted on April 30,
It enshrined a doubly restrictive approach, combining elements of
regulatory models previously adopted in Washington D.C. and New South
Wales, Australia. Of the five practice models that Convocation considered
for adoption-fully integrated MDPs; maintenance of the "status quo" with
the practice of law in partnerships only; MDP services provided lawyers
maintain effective control of the partnership-the New South Wales
model; 10 7 MDPs offering primarily legal services with no specific
provisions for control-the D.C. model; 10 8 and MDPs offering legal
services only, provided that the partnership is in the effective control of
lawyers-only the last option was considered to be in the public interest.10 9
At numerous points, the Task Force recommending this model took pains
to point towards the accounting profession as the principal protagonists for
MDPs, yet the Task Force did not directly suggest that such firms'
arrangements in continental Europe or elsewhere violated professional
ethical rules or the rules that govern the legal profession. 110 The specter
used to justify a doubly restrictive regime in no way took into account the
public interest in broader access to legal services or even the supply-side
pressures from its own membership. Yet the rhetoric of the public interest
and a normative justification of special barriers were invoked to justify the
ultimate recommendations and insular approach that the Task Force
adopted:
An analysis of these unique features of the profession make it clear that as
lawyers we are not simply at one with other professionals and service
1999.106

106. BY-LAW No. 25 (Law Soc'y of Upper Can. 1999) [hereinafter LAW Soc'y BY-LAW
25], was later amended three times in 1999 (May 28, June 25, and December 10), twice in
2001 (April 26 and May 24), and once in 2002 (October 31), but the changes are not
substantial for the purposes of this discussion. The By-Law was revoked on May 1, 2007, as
part of housekeeping amendments necessitated by the October 2006 amendments to the Law
Society Act. See TnE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., BY-LAw REVIEW COMM., REPORT TO
CONVOCATION APR. 26, 2007 (2007), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/medial
convapr07_bylawreview.pdf; see also LAW SOc'Y BY-LAw 7, supra note 14, pt. III. The
prior numbering was in place during the period until 2003 and is therefore retained for this
discussion.
107. See LAW SOC'Y OF NEW S. WALES PROF'L CONDUCT AND PRACTICE RULE R. 40.1
(repealed
2008),
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/ForSolictors/professionalstandards/
Ruleslegislation/SolicitorsRules/027157.
108. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2006).
109. FUTURES TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 105, Executive Summary.

110. Id. Executive Summary ("The early (and current) protagonists for the development
of MDPs are the large chartered accounting or professional services firms who see the
partnering of lawyers and accountants as the next logical step in the continued globalization
and consolidation of professional services."). Yet, not two paragraphs later the Task Force
notes that such developments could flow to "main street," involving lawyers and other
professionals, and service providers in small centers and smaller firms or sole practices. Id.
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providers being guided by a need to serve with due care and skill. The
law has imposed special societal responsibilities upon us [that] we must
discharge in the public interest. If we fail, we not only do ourselves
discredit but, more important[ly], we undermine the values themselves
and place important societal interests at risk. This is the responsibility
1
[that] must be weighed in assessing our compatibility with MDPs.
For the first time in Ontario, By-Law 25 regulated the conduct of law
firms rather than just that of a firm's individual lawyers. It allowed lawyer
members of the Law Society to enter into association with a nonlawyer only
if that person was "of good character"; was qualified to practice a
"profession, trade or occupation that supports or supplements the practice of
law"; agreed that the lawyer partner would have "effective control" over
that person's activities insofar as they were providing services to clients of
the partnership or association; and would comply with the Law Society's
rules, regulations, and policies. 1 12 Unlike other bylaws that governed its
members, By-Law 25 required an application by a lawyer member of the
Society to be filed with the Law Society and approved before entering into
the MDP. The rules reinforced the second-class status of any nonlawyer
professional in a multidisciplinary partnership or association and imposed a
primacy on Law Society rules over those of any other profession or trade
similarly regulated by government in the public interest.
The outcome was not surprising, given the work of the Task Force and its
bias against radical change. The Task Force's discussion in its final report
under the heading "MDPs, the Role of the Lawyer, and the Public Interest"
begins as follows:
The Law Society's study was premised on the belief that the legal
profession should not embrace MDPs, whatever the commercial
attractions, until a demonstrable and legitimate demand outweighs the
risks to the profession in the public interest. The focus must be on the
preservation of a strong and independent legal profession. 113
Several features of this admission merit attention. It makes abundantly
clear that the study had a transparently self-interested bias, despite evidence
from its own 1998 survey data that 2775 members of 7134 responding, or
approximately thirty-nine percent of those surveyed, maintained "regular
referral arrangements with other non-legal professionals." ' 1 4 Even more
striking, a full eleven percent (767 of 7066 responding) acknowledged
providing legal services to clients regularly "jointly with other professions
and/or non-legal disciplines [through which] those services are also
available."1 5 In effect, this latter group was already operating in a form of
111. Id. para. 97.
112. See LAW Soc'Y BY-LAw 25, supra note 106, §§ 4(l)-(4) (defining "effective

control" and "good character").
113. FuTuREs TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 105, Executive Summary
(emphasis added).
114. Id. app. 10 (MDP Form and Data).
115. Id.
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multidisciplinary practice arrangement, even though the Law Society was
not regulating it and was taking steps to prevent it.11 6 Further, the
definition of the public interest was equated with a strong and independent
legal profession. Finally, the conception of appropriate regulation utilized
is that the Law Society would not permit something (that by its own data
was already occurring) until such time that a "demonstrable and legitimate
demand" was proven."l 7 No criteria were offered anywhere in the report
for what threshold should be adopted for "demonstrable" demand, and
"legitimate" demand appeared to be whatever the Law Society determined
it to be. The statement was also undercut by the evidence laid out in the
report's appendices from business lawyers and in-house counsel about the
118
utility of multidisciplinary services in particular business contexts.
Given the premise of the study acknowledged by the Task Force in its
report, the outcome of its investigation was inevitable.
For all of the purported concern that the Law Society expressed in its
report about the public interest, at no time did the Task Force or its
academic experts consult with the public. In stark contrast to the American
Bar Association MDP Commission's approach, there were no open
hearings, no posting of testimony or submissions, no soliciting of views or
invitations to groups such as the Canadian Federation of Independent
Business (the most significant lobby group for small business in Canada),
local chambers of commerce, Members of Provincial Parliament, or the
public at large.
The sessions that the Task Force held with lawyers in business and
practice highlighted that client demand for "one-stop shopping" developing
internationally was in part responsible for the drive for MDPs; that a "team"
approach was valuable and should result in reduced costs; and that if ethical
questions were adequately addressed, MDPs would enhance the availability
and delivery of legal services. The ethical concerns around whether and
how a client received legal advice and indeed defining what constitutes the
practice of law were important, both for maintaining privilege (particularly
in a criminal law context) and, astoundingly, for the rationale for affording
the Law Society the privilege of self-regulation. As the summary put it,
The argument is that if there is no clear vision of what the solicitor/client
relationship is and what the legal services are that the Law Society can
regulate to the exclusion of others, then lawyers cannot sell the

116. Id. (The Law Society's analysis of the survey notes, "A significantly smaller number
of respondents (about 760) indicated that business arrangements with others were entered
into to provide multi-discipline services to clients. What is not known is whether this is a
result of the current restrictions within the regulatory regime, a desire on the part of lawyers
to remain in control and independent, or a combination of both.").
117. Id. Executive Summary.
118. Id. app. 9 (Discussion Sessions with Practising Members, Employed Members,
Accountants, and In-House Counsel).
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proposition that there is a public interest in having lawyers maintain
independence.119

B. By-Law 32: Affiliated Law Firm Rules
By-Law 25 was not the end of the MDP story in Ontario. The Futures
Task Force report had noted the presence of law firms "captive" to Big Five
accounting firms in continental Europe and the presence in Ontario of
Donahue & Partners, a law firm established by the accounting giant Ernst &
Young. The report noted that the Donahue law firm was a separate
partnership, but had linkages to the accounting firm, "including a physical
presence within the premises of the accounting firm's offices."' 120 It further
remarked that "there are regulatory issues [that] require independent study
with respect to this model" and recommended
that "an appropriate vehicle
' 12 1
be struck to undertake [such a] study."

Accordingly, first in September 1998 and again in June 1999,
Convocation mandated the Multi-Disciplinary Practice Task Force to "deal
with the issue" of what it labeled a "captive law firm model," the provision
of legal services to the public through law practices affiliated with
professional-service or accounting firms. 122

The Task Force was to

examine questions of "control, trading style, management, conflicts of
interest and related matters." 123 The Task Force reported that "in
examining issues that the affiliated law firm structure may create for the
practice of law, [it was] aiming in particular to isolate the key regulatory
issues and, if necessary, design an appropriate regulatory scheme within
124
which the affiliated firm may operate."'
The end result was By-Law 32, entitled Affiliations with Non-Members,
passed on May 24, 2001. By-Law 32 imposed a notification requirement
125 It
on a lawyer member or firm that "affiliates with an affiliated entity.'
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. Executive Summary.
Id.
See THE LAW Soc'Y OF UPPER CAN., STATUS REPORT OF THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE TASK FORCE: REPORT TO CONVOCATION Nov. 26, 1999, at 1 & n.2 (1999)
[hereinafter THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., STATUS REPORT], available at
http://www.suc.on.ca/media/MDPreportnov99.PDF (referencing a mandate from June
1999); MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TASK FORCE, CONSULTATION SESSION INFORMATION
ON THE AFFILIATED OR "CAPTIVE" LAW FIRM (1999), reprintedin THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER
CAN., STATUS REPORT, supra, app. 2 (noting that the issue first arose at the September 1998
Convocation).
123. THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TASK FORCE,
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE: REPORT TO CONVOCATION APR. 26, 2001, at 1 n.1 (2001)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION REPORT]), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/
mdptaskforcereport.pdf (quoting The Law Soc'y of Upper Can. Transcript of Convocation

218 (Sept. 25, 1998).
124. THE LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., STATUS REPORT, supra note 122, at 1.
125. BY-LAw No. 32, § 1(2) (Law Soc'y of Upper Can. 2001) (repealed 2007)
[hereinafter LAW Soc'Y BY-LAw 32], available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/

revokedbylaw32.pdf. Note that this By-Law was also revoked on May 1, 2007, as part of the
consequential changes required by the October 2006 amendments to the Law Society Act but
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provided a form' 26 that is to be filed annually that details the financial
arrangements that exist between the two firms; sets out "the ownership,
control and management of the practice through which the member or
group delivers legal services"; informs the Society of the compliance by the
lawyer members with the Law Society's rules on conflicts of interest and
confidentiality with respect to clients who are also clients of the affiliated
entity; and provides other information required to satisfy the Society as 127
to
the arrangements between the lawyer or law firm and the affiliated entity.
Continuing the control requirements imposed in By-Law 25, By-Law 32
required that lawyers own and maintain control of the practice through
which the legal services are delivered.128
It stipulated a physical
segregation of the premises from which the legal services are delivered
from those used by the affiliated entity for the delivery of its nonlegal
services, "other than those that are delivered by the affiliated entity jointly
with the legal services of the member or group." 129 The definition of
"affiliation" was broad and was considered problematic even by the Task
Force itself. By-Law 32 provided that "a member or group of members
affiliates with an affiliated entity when the member or group on a regular
basis joins with the affiliated entity in the delivery or promotion and
delivery of the legal services of
the member or group and the non-legal
130
services of the affiliated entity."'
The Task Force acknowledged that "the definition of affiliation captures
more than law firms and non-law firms who by design operate under
comprehensive arrangements for the joint delivery of legal and non-legal
services. Convocation, however, agreed that the definition proposed by the
131
Task Force was appropriate."
Other elements of the scheme are noteworthy. No profit-sharing or feesplitting was to be allowed. Most importantly, the clearance of conflicts
would act as an impediment to any association on any meaningful scale
nationally or internationally: a system would have to be established to
search for conflicts in both the law firm and the affiliated firm. The Task
Force stated that "the conflicts search regime should ...extend to searches
for conflicts in firms affiliated with the law firm that practice outside
Canada in [which] separate national firms or offices of the non-lawyer firm
32
are treated economically as if they were one firm." 1
In the end, Ontario was left with and retains a restrictive regime for both
MDPs and affiliated law firms. Initiatives were voted upon before the
that its provisions remain in force, with different numeration in the new By-Law 7. LAW
Soc'Y BY-LAW 7, supra note 14.
126. The Law Soc'y of Upper Can., Notice of Affiliation, By-Law 32, Form 32A (2001),
available at http://www.Isuc.on.ca/media/form32aEN.pdf.
127. LAW Soc'y BY-LAW 32, supra note 125, §§ 3-4.

128. Id. § 2(a)-(b).
129. Id. § 2(c).
130. Id. § 1(2).
131. IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 123, at 14.

132. Id. at 3.
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debates at the Canadian Bar Association or elsewhere had been completed.
Aggressive moves to insulate the Ontario position from contradiction by the
Canadian Bar Association, as detailed above, beg the question as to whether
the regulator was acting in the public interest or in the profession's selfinterest.
It was this perception of the mixing of self-interest and public interest
that led to the effective end of self-regulation for the legal profession in
England, coincident with legislation mandating the facilitation of alternative
business structures, including the MDP, in 2007.133 As the Ethics 20/20
Commission considers the impact of international developments on the
practice of law in the United States and by American firms, English
developments in particular will play a critical role in that competitive
assessment. Further, the fact that English authorities have reconciled "core
values" considerations with liberalization of service delivery options should
challenge the ABA to reconsider the language of Resolution lOF and adopt
a new way forward. Before considering those reforms, however, the history
of the MDP debate in British Columbia, California, and New York round
out the North American picture and further demonstrate that self-interest
and core values rhetoric, left unchecked, are a recipe for retrenchment and
calcification.
V. THE LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

In British Columbia, the Legal Profession Act 134 grants to the Law
Society of British Columbia the authority to regulate the legal profession
and to make rules "for the governing of the society, lawyers, articled
students and applicants." 135 Section 3 of the Act requires that the public
interest be paramount by making it
the object and duty of the [Law S]ociety
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of
justice by
(i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,
(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and [honor] of its members,
and
(iii) establishing standards for the education, professional responsibility
and competence of its members .... 136
Curiously, subject to the responsibilities just enumerated, the object of the
137
Law Society is also to "uphold and protect the interests of its members."'

133. Paton, supra note 13, at 116-18; see also Anthony E. Davis, Regulation of the Legal
Profession in the United States and the Futureof Global Law Practice,PROF. LAW., 2009, at

1,8.
134. 1998 S.B.C., ch. 9 (B.C.).

135. Id. § 11(1).
136. Id. § 3(a)(i)-(iii).
137. Id. § 3(b)(ii).
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Until a December 2001 vote on a pro-MDP resolution failed to garner a
138
it
sufficient majority to result in the adoption of a liberal MDP rule,
appeared as though the Law Society of British Columbia would take an
approach to MDPs that would be radically different from the restrictive
regulatory framework adopted in Ontario. This followed over two years of
steps towards an open regime. In October 1999, Law Society benchers
(governors) agreed in principle to relax the prohibition on fee splitting to
permit multidisciplinary practice, "subject to the adoption of a regulatory
scheme that protect[ed] the core values of the legal profession, such as
privilege, confidentiality and professional independence."' 139 Throughout
the first half of 2000, an MDP Task Force presented further options on a
regulatory scheme for MDPs in the province.
Through a series of
nonbinding "straw votes," benchers made provisional decisions on the
principles to protect core values that should underpin the regulatory
scheme.
The Task Force drafted rules based on the straw votes. These were first
introduced at the Law Society's December 2000 meeting. Benchers had
concluded that the Law Society should regulate the MDP through the
lawyers participating in it rather than by regulating the firm itself (in
contrast to the Ontario MDP rules), just as it did for law firms. With
respect to control of the MDP, two options were considered. One would
require lawyers to be a majority of the MDP's partners. The other, which
benchers favored, would place no restrictions on control of the MDP and
would allow lawyers to comprise a minority of the MDP's partners,
provided that the delivery of legal services remained under lawyer control.
On the question of who could participate in an MDP, benchers did not favor
restricting membership to other self-regulating professionals, but thought
that nonlawyers in other businesses should be allowed to participate. Their
rationale was public spirited, as well as economically attuned to lawyers'
needs:
"A restrictive approach may preclude sensible and economic
arrangements between lawyers and members of other occupations that may
serve the public well."' 140 Benchers were not comfortable, however, with an
"open ownership" model.
Benchers directly rejected the approach adopted by Ontario (and built on
the District of Columbia model) that restricted the scope of services to those
directly related to the practice of law. Again, the rationale considered the
ability of consumers and the public to access services, as well as the
lawyers' economic interests:
"A client's problems can cut across
professional boundaries, and it is the potential convenience, lower cost and

138. The proposal, discussed below, attracted a majority of votes, but more than a simple
majority was required to amend the Law Society Rules.
139. Consultation on Multi-Disciplinary Practice,BENCHERS' BULL. SUPPLEMENT (The
Law Soc'y of B.C., Vancouver, B.C.), July-Aug. 2001, http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/
publications forms/bulletin/2000-01/01-08supp MDP.html.
140. Id.
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better and more comprehensive advice that may attract consumers to a
a
multi-disciplinary practice."''
On the issue of client confidentiality, the benchers took a similarly
pragmatic approach, rejecting proposals that would prohibit lawyers from
participating in MDPs or from acting for clients when there is a high
probability that conflicting confidentiality standards would arise. The
consultation paper noted that "[a]lthough such prohibitions would minimize
the potential for conflict, they may prohibit some of the most useful forms
of MDP for consumers." 142 The provision of audit and legal services to the
same client was not banned outright, but was prevented "unless[in all cases]
the client gives informed consent to the disclosure."' 143 The answers lay not
in protecting the "guild," but in figuring out pragmatic solutions that
144
afforded minimum regulatory intrusion.
The Law Society's 2001 president, Richard Margetts, Q.C., continued
this focus on consumer needs, as well as on lawyers' seeing new challenges
as opportunities, not threats. In two separate articles to the legal profession
in British Columbia, Margetts expressed his disappointment in what he saw
as the profession's tendency to regard any change as a threat. 145 He
identified a need for increasing integration of legal practice and other
disciplines. In dealing with MDPs, as well as other forces of change, the
challenge was "'to grasp the inevitability of change and use it as a creative
force . . . . In the face of new competition, we cannot simply "circle the
46
wagons". . . to protect our turf." 1
Margetts rejected the reliance on a "core values" defense and openly
challenged the assumption that "lawyers [in an MDP] will be prepared to
abandon their professional obligations at the whim of their non-lawyer
partners." 147 He did not share the "pessimistic view" of those who would
question the fitness or character of "those members of our profession who
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Richard Margetts, "You Don't Need a Weatherman": Another Word in the
Multi-Disciplinary Practice Debate, 59 ADVOCATE 543 (2001) [hereinafter Margetts, You
Don't Need a Weatherman]; Richard S. Margetts, President's View: Lawyers at the

Crossroads, BENCHERS' BULL. (The Law Soc'y of B.C., Vancouver, B.C.), Jan.-Feb. 2001,
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications-forms/bulletin/2000-01/01-02.html
[hereinafter
Margetts, President's View]; see also Brad Daisley, Profile: Karl Warner, the New
Presidentof the Law Society of British Columbia, Wants To Loosen the Reins of Regulation
and Open the Profession to Competition, LAW. WKLY. (Can.), Mar. 10, 2000, available at
TLWN (Lexis).

145. Margetts, President's View, supra note 144; Richard Margetts, The ChangingNature
of the Practiceof Law: A Reply to Mr. Giles on the Issue of Multi-DisciplinaryPractice,59
ADVOCATE 31 (2001) [hereinafter Margetts, The Changing Nature of the Practice of Law];
see also Jack Giles, Response to the Presidenton Multi-DisciplinaryPractice,59 ADVOCATE

233 (2001).
146. Gary Oakes, Profile: Richard Margetts, the New President of the Law Society of
B.C., Sees a Need To Maximize Opportunities Posed by the Changing Landscape, LAW.
WKLY. (Can.), Mar. 16, 2001, available at TLWN (Lexis) (quoting Richard Margetts).

147. Margetts, The ChangingNature of the Practiceof Law, supra note 145, at 32.
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might wish to practise in a multi-disciplinary setting,"' 14 8 and he noted that
it was arguable that restrictions on MDPs were unconstitutional. Finally,
directly rejecting the Law Society of Upper Canada's conclusion that the
entire MDP debate was prompted only by the expansionist desires of the
"Big Five accounting firms," Margetts' argument was firmly anchored in a
sense of the public interest:
It is a mistake to focus on the ambitions of the Big Five as a determinant
of the relationship between the partners of a prospective business
association.
Ultimately, the consumer will determine successful
arrangements....
Requiring lawyers to be in 149
control will be perceived by the public as
simply protecting a monopoly.
This vision, as well as the principles articulated by the Law Society of
British Columbia in its evaluation of the MDP issue and the rules proposed
by its Multi-Disciplinary Practice Working Group, relied upon a
fundamentally different conception of the regulators' role and the
importance of the public interest in a regime that afforded the flexibility for
lawyers to choose the form of delivery through which they wished to
deliver legal services, rather than having it dictated to them. Even though
the relationship between the regulator and the provincial government was
the same in the two jurisdictions, the results of the consultations were
strikingly different.
In December 2001, however, benchers rejected the proposed rule changes
that would have enshrined the principles approved in the earlier "straw
votes" and allowed lawyers to engage in MDPs with nonlawyers. The
proposed rule changes that implemented MDPs in British Columbia
received a majority of votes of the benchers present and voting, fourteen to
thirteen, but required a two-thirds majority to be implemented. The reasons
offered for the rejection were based in the "core values" vocabulary and in
the unsatisfactory explanations of the sort offered in Ontario about
consumer interest. The Law Society of B.C.'s newsletter reported the
outcome:
While praising the high quality and comprehensive material presented by
the Working Group in December, many of the Benchers lacked comfort
that the proposed rules could sufficiently protect the core values of the
profession.
It was also flagged by several Benchers that there is currently a lack of
150
demand within the profession for such a regulatory scheme ....
The explanations are extraordinary for several reasons. First, there was
no evidence in any of the British Columbia reports of the level of demand
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The Law Soc'y of B.C., Benchers Say No to Multi-Disciplinary Practice,
BENCHERS' BULL. (The Law Soc'y of B.C., Vancouver, B.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2001,
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publicationsjforms/bulletin/2000-01/0 1-12-14_MDP.html.
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for MDPs, either from within the profession or from the public. The
argument was consistently anecdotal. The view, of the President of the Law
Society had been a market-liberalizing approach for at least two years.
Margetts had advocated allowing consumers to decide how they wanted to
access their legal services and lawyers to decide how they wanted to offer
them. Questions of demand, then, were arguably irrelevant to the
regulatory scheme; if they were relevant, there was no evidence to support
any conclusion about them. The language of "core values" again became a
crutch upon which recalcitrant benchers could comfortably rest without
having to articulate how they thought the "core values" would be
compromised by the proposed rules.
As a result, today there are no specific rules in British Columbia to
govern MDPs apart from the existing restrictions on marketing, fee sharing,
and lawyers' activities provided for in the Legal Profession Act, Law
Society Rules, or ProfessionalConduct Handbook. Whether what lawyers
are already doing in their business arrangements is acceptable was left
unclear, and all of the talk regarding international competitiveness and the
consumer interest was simply rhetoric.
VI. THE CALIFORNIA BAR
Like British Columbia, by 2003 California lacked a single governing rule
or regime for multidisciplinary practices, although there were "existing
practice models through which a form of indirect MDP currently [existed]
in California, and ...potentially viable models for permitting a 'pure form'
of MDP to exist" there. 151 Rule 1-310, operative since September 1992,
provides that a member "shall not form a partnership with a person who is
not a lawyer if any of the activities of that partnership consist of the practice
of law."' 52 Just as in British Columbia, in California the regulatory body
responsible for MDP rules signaled a more direct interest in responding to
consumer accessibility and indeed situated the MDP issue as "just one
aspect of [a] much larger delivery system issue," one that requires
leadership from within the legal profession to serve client needs in light of a
"revolution" in the delivery of information, including legal information. 53
Building on the work of the ABA Commission on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice, a California State Bar Task Force on Multi-Disciplinary Practice
proposed various rule changes that would permit MDPs in various forms.
The Task Force report was first discussed at a California Bar Board of
Governors meeting on July 28, 2001. It was released for comment in
August 2001; comments were to have been discussed at Board meetings
scheduled for August 2002.154 However, that discussion never took place

151. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP, supra note 18, at iii.
152. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-310 (2010).
153. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP, supra note 18, at 3.
154. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, MDP Information (Jan. 18, 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdp-statesunm.html.
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and the item was tabled. 155 Instead, the California State Bar's Long-Range
Strategic Plan, dated August 23, 2002, recommended continuing assessment
of the feasibility "of permitting lawyers to join with non-lawyer
professionals in a practice
[in which] both legal and non-legal professional
56
services are offered."'
The State Bar task force viewed the five MDP models identified by the
ABA Commission on MDPs as insufficiently comprehensive. It also
conceded that associations through which lawyers practice law and offer
legal services continue to evolve and that the five models at least offered a
basis for its findings. Three of the models-the cooperative model, the
ancillary business model, and the contract (strategic alliance) model-were
determined to be within existing standards, fully viable without the need to
change existing California rules or regulations. With respect to the District
of Columbia "command and control" model on which the Ontario By-Law
25 governing MDPs was based, the report found that it "allows for a form
of multidisciplinary practice within the confines of lawyer-controlled legal
services" but is not a "'pure form' MDP." 157 It would require changes to
California's existing prohibitions on fee-sharing (CRPC 1-320) and
partnering with nonlawyer professionals (CRPC 1-310) to implement this
model, but the report recommended that such changes could be made
"consistent with 'core values' to allow this model to be viable in
158
California."
Consistent with the ABA and CBA reports and the B.C.-approved
principles, the California State Bar Task Force report found that a fully
integrated professional services firm, the fifth of the ABA models, would
permit the "'core values' of the legal profession not only [to] be maintained,
but [also to] be reaffirmed."' 59 The report's recommendations in this
regard, however, were far from an open regime. Passive investment would
be prohibited in this and all other legal practices. Allowing such a "'pure
form' MDP" to exist would require cross-imputation of all professionals to
each other when integrated services are provided to consumers and a
presumption that when a consumer seeks assistance from the MDP, the
155. Telephone Interview with Randall Difuntorum, Prof'l Competence Unit, The State
Bar of Cal. (Mar. 17, 2003). Difortunum suggested the matter might come back before the
Board in August 2003, but there is no accessible record of it ever having done so.
156. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 17, at 11. There

is no reference in the 2004 Strategic Plan to MDPs.
157. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP, supranote 18, at v.

158. Id. at v, 20, 22-23, 38-42.

Various other rules would require modification,

including CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-300 (aiding the unauthorized practice of
law); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6150-6159.2

(West 2003) (advertising and solicitation); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003)
(protection of client confidential information); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-300, 3310, 3-320 (avoidance of conflicts of interest); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-600
(professional independent judgment); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-100(D)
(geographic scope of rules); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2-100 (communication with
a represented party) and others.
159. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP, supranote 18, at vi.
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consumer must affirmatively opt out of the legal services for the "lawyer
values" to cease to apply. 160 The Task Force proposed exploring this
model, subject to State Bar certification, although responsibility for
adherence to the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct would rest with
individual lawyers. If a breach of Bar rules occurred, the MDP would be
subject to decertification. 16 1 The model was thus a combination of the
British Columbia emphasis on individual lawyer accountability and the
Ontario licensing and certification of firms in bylaws for MDPs.
The California Bar approach for the Fully Integrated Model reflected an
emphasis on lawyers' maintaining relationships solely with other
professionals. Under the Demonstration Program, lawyers would only be
able to partner with licensed "'professionals' as defined in existing state
wage and hour laws (i.e., licensed professionals in law, medicine, dentistry,
pharmacy, optometry, architecture, engineering, teaching, accounting or
another traditionally recognized 'learned' profession). '162 Further, there
would be a requirement that the licensed profession in question "maintain a
code of professional ethics... compatible with the legal profession's 'core
values."' 1 63 These aspects of the proposal threw into question whether the
form being proposed was indeed an open integrated multidisciplinary
practice, as the report suggested, or a model more of the type adopted in
Ontario, which is called an MDP but in reality is a law firm with other
professional services serving as an inferior adjunct to the firm's primary
focus.
While appearing to be a quantum leap beyond the model of "side-byside" alliances, the proposal was tame, clearly tempered by the Task
Force's focus on the "'special' role of lawyers" with "values and duties that
have traditionally resulted in lawyers being segregated from other
164
professionals and regulated by the judicial branch of government."'
Relying on the language of Justice Joyce L. Kennard in Howard v.
Babcock,165 the Task Force Report was emphatic in its efforts to assert that
lawyers need to aspire to goals higher than financial gain alone:
As professionals consider joining together with lawyers in an MDP
environment, there will have to be an acceptance of the "core values" of
the legal profession .... There will also have to be acceptance by

160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id.
163. Id. The report uses the certified public accountant audit function (in conflict with
the lawyer's duty of confidentiality) and the duty of certain health care and counseling
professionals to disclose evidence of child abuse (in conflict with the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality) to illustrate situations of "some professional services that so inherently
conflict that they cannot be integrated in an MDP environment." Id. at 30.
164. Id. at 11-12.
165. 863 P.2d 150, 166 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("If the practice of law is to

remain a profession and retain public confidence and respect, it must be guided by
something better than the objective of accumulating wealth.").
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lawyers of the "core values" of the other professionals within
an MDP
1 66
[that] do not conflict with the legal profession's "core values."
VII. THE NEW YORK STATE BAR

Just as Ontario was the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt MDP rules,
New York was the first of the U.S. states formally to entrench rules to
govern MDPs. The four appellate divisions of the New York Supreme

Court, by joint order, adopted rules to govern ancillary services and
strategic alliances with nonlegal professional service providers on July 24,
2001, effective November 1, 2001. The changes to the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility (in place until April 2009),167 made New York
the first state to adopt rules that specifically governed lawyer participation
in MDPs. 168 The language adopted to "'protect[] the core values of the
legal profession,""' 169 however, was far from an endorsement of integrated
multidisciplinary practice and was even less progressive than the restrictive
Ontario rules criticized above.
In sharp contrast to the recommendations of the ABA's Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice and to the Ontario rules, the two 2001 New York
rules at the heart of that state's regulatory scheme prevented any
meaningful integration of lawyers and nonlawyers in the same firm. The
first of these, the former DR 1-106, specified the circumstances in which a
lawyer in an ancillary business would be subject to lawyer discipline
rules. 170 The second rule, the former DR 1-107, set out when and how
"contractual relationships" would be permitted between lawyers and
nonlawyers. 171
The rules categorically prohibited nonlawyers from
ownership or management interests in law firms; prevented nonlawyers
from regulating the professional judgment of lawyers; banned fee sharing

166. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON MDP, supra note 18, at 17.

167. In April 2009, the New York State Bar adopted changes to the state Rules of
Professional Conduct that in essence made New York the next-to-last state (California being
the only holdout) to base its lawyer discipline rules on the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pt. 1200 (2009); see also Richard Acello, New
York Makes Itself a 'Model' State: CaliforniaNow the Only Holdout on Adopting the ABA
Model Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 22. This discussion refers to the prior scheme, though
the restrictions on MDPs remain.
168. See News Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, New Rules Clarify Standards for N.Y.
Lawyers' Alliances with Nonlegal Professional Service Firms (July 24, 2001), in W. VA.
LAW., Sept. 2001, at 19; New York Becomes First To Allow Multidisciplinary Business
Affiliations, DAILY TAX REPORT No. 145, Jul. 30, 2001, at G4 [hereinafter N.Y Becomes
First], available at 145 DTR G-4, 2001 (Westlaw). It should be noted, however, that the
District of Columbia has permitted nonlawyer partners in law firms since the early 1990s.
District of Columbia Rule 5.4(b) permits such arrangements only if the "partnership or
organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients." D.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(1) (2006). Accordingly, the D.C. rule is viewed as governing

law firm arrangements rather than MDPs per se.
169. News Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 168 (quoting Steven C. Krane,
President of the N.Y. State Bar Association).
170. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2009).

171. Id. R. 5.8.
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between lawyers and nonlawyers; prohibited referral fees; and enshrined a
presumption that a client who receives nonlegal services from an ancillary
business will believe that those services are subject to an attorney-client
relationship.1 72 The scheme also imposed minimum educational standards
on nonlawyer professionals who want to participate in strategic alliances
with lawyers and required them to be licensed by a government entity and
73
bound by an enforceable code of conduct. 1
DR 1-107 began with a long policy statement stressing the "core values"
of the U.S. legal profession-independence, maintenance of client
confidences, and preservation of client funds. It then went on to state that
"[m]ulti-disciplinary practice between lawyers and nonlawyers is
incompatible with the core values of the legal profession and therefore, a
strict division between services provided by lawyers and those provided by
nonlawyers is essential to protect those values."' 174 Even more restrictive
than the Ontario approach, nonlawyers under the former DR 1-107(a)(2)
(now New York Rule 5.8(a)(2)) were prevented from having any ownership
75
or investment interest in the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm.1
In addition to the two new rules, amendments to existing rules on
publicity and advertising (the former DR 2-101),176 professional notices and
letterheads (the former DR 2-102), 177 and solicitation and referrals (the
former DR 2-103)178 imposed special requirements on lawyers who form
alliances with nonlawyers about how they present themselves to the public.
For example, the name of the nonlawyer or nonlawyer professional service
179
could not be incorporated into the law firm's name.
In essence, far from opening the market to new forms of integrated
service offerings, the New York Bar rules constituted a complicated
impediment to new forms of services delivery. Indeed, the text of the new
rules entrenched the philosophical bias of the New York State Bar
Association's four-hundred-page report, entitled Preserving the Core
Values of the American Legal Profession, against professional integration
80
and in favor of tight regulation of "side-by-side" business arrangements. 1
The New York State Bar Association, which represents approximately
70,000 members, is the official statewide organization of lawyers in New
York and is the largest voluntary state bar association in the United
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. R. 5.7, 5.8.
Id. R. 5.8.
Id.
Id.
See id. R. 7.1.

177. See id. R. 7.5.
178. See id. R. 7.3.

179. See id. R. 7.5(b).
180. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE
AND OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000)
[hereinafter N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES]. For background on the
Chair of the Committee and a key figure in the ABA deliberations, see Victor Futter &
E. Nobles Lowe, A Profile of Robert MacCrate, EXPERIENCE, Summer 2001, at 30.
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States.' 81 Its president in 2001 at the time MDP rules were being adopted,
Steven Krane, acknowledged that lawyers and nonlawyers had been
informally coordinating client-service efforts for many years, but said that
the new regulations would "give lawyers guidance on what they can and
cannot do instead of leaving it to them to find the governing principles
scattered throughout the Code of Professional Responsibility.' ' 182 Krane
did not suggest, however, that the rules were directed at better client
service; instead, his comments on the adoption of the new regime suggest
that the primary goal was protection of the lawyers' ability to control the
practice of law:
"Throughout the nationwide debate on MDP's, we have been maintaining
that lawyers can provide clients with the purported benefits of coordinated
professional services without giving the nonlawyer professionals any
say... in the way [that] lawyers practice law. The new rules announced
today (July 24) accomplish that goal by establishing a regulatory
framework...83 that reaffirms and protects the core values of the legal
profession." 1
This "core-values" emphasis would have been familiar to Krane from his
work as vice-chair of the New York State Bar committee, whose report
formed the basis of the Bar's recommendations for the rule changes that the
New York courts adopted and was cited as an instrumental influence in the
ABA House of Delegates deliberations that led to Resolution 1OF. 184 The
committee's report was replete with references to the unique place of the
American Bar in the U.S. legal and governmental system, in contrast to the
major accounting and professional-service firms whose interest in legal
services was said to be "in acquiring ownership and control of the
unidisciplinary practice of law for its own sake.' 185 It expressed fears that
lawyers would lose "their professional culture if many of their daily
colleagues and partners come from other professions" or that lawyers would
"cut ethical corners, to reduce pro bono commitments, or to relax the
profession's rules, if colleagues from other professions ... call on them to
181. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, A Brief History and Purpose, http://www.nysba.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/AboutNYSBA/HistoryandStructureoftheAssociation/History-anL
Structur.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
182. N.Y.Becomes First,supranote 168.
183. News Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 168 (quoting Steven C. Krane,
President of the N.Y. State Bar Association).
184. Cone, supra note 2, at 12-13; see also Sydney M. Cone, III, The Future Debate on
MultidisciplinaryPractice in the United States, 2 EuR. J. L. REFORM 611, 625 (2000).
185. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES, supra note 180, at 117
("Two features distinguish the regulation and professionalization of the American bar from
those of most other professions."); id. at 109 ("In contrast to the divided bar in other
common law countries and the diffuse character of lawyering in various civil law countries,
the American legal profession over the last 200 years has evolved as a single profession, set
apart and unified by its organization, education and common body of learning, as well as by
acquired skills and adopted values associated with the profession. Law and medicine have
been distinguished in this manner from other professions in the United States, including that
of accountancy, which has never achieved an identity but has been splintered and spread into
diffuse components." (footnote omitted)); see also Cone, supra note 2, at 13.
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do so."' 186 These fears animated the report's conclusion that the Bar would
"enter into new forms of practice only at the cost of injury to its
independence and to the rule of law," "[i]f positive answers to these [fears]
cannot be found."' 87 The answers proposed by the report-and ultimately
adopted by the New York courts-rested on the proposition that strict
separation of legal services is a prerequisite. The Report suggested that
contracting legal and nonlegal professional-service firms should be given
substantial flexibility to determine the form of their MDP relationship, so
long as the three essential requirements (disclosure of the relationship to
clients, lawyer ownership and control of the legal practice, and the
nonlegal
188
firm's meeting recognized professional standards) were satisfied.
The New York Bar was ultimately successful, then, in having this view
adopted by the New York courts, thereby making a "non-MDP" policy the
answer to the MDP question in the State. The New York approach
resonated with the Ontario MDP approach (particularly in respect of the
second phase of the Ontario scheme that deals with "captive" law firm
relationships with nonlawyer providers). In the end, in all four jurisdictions
and at the national level in both Canada and the United States, "core values"
rhetoric and anticompetitive undercurrents had served to prevent the
integrated multidisciplinary practice from entering into being. Elsewhere,
however, change was afoot that would lead to quite different results.
VIII. ENGLAND
Substantive developments in England in the last decade, and in particular
in the last five years, have provided an astounding contrast to the North
American approaches to the MDP issue to date. One crucial difference has
been direct intervention in the legal services marketplace by government.
The Office of Fair Trading, a government ministry, initially signaled in
2001 that if the Law Society of England and Wales, key regulator of the
legal profession in England at the time, did not change rules to
accommodate MDPs, then the government would do so for it. Even though
the Law Society then made steps towards accommodating change, change
did not come quickly enough on this or other issues. Fundamental
transformation in the regulation of the legal profession in England and
Wales--and the effective end of self-regulation-followed, culminating in
the adoption of the Legal Services Act, 2007.189 The legislation included a
more open, competitive, and consumer-oriented approach to the delivery of
legal services, with Parliament mandating "alternative business structures,"
including the MDP. 190
186. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES, supra note 180, at 324.
187. Id.

188. Id. at 342-52 (discussing the necessary rule changes "With Respect to
Interprofessional 'Strategic Alliances' and other Contractual Relationships Between Lawyers
and Nonlawyers").
189. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.).
190. Id. pt. 5.
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The March 2001 release of a report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT),
the U.K.'s competition and antitrust authority, marked the critical point of
government intervention in the English MDP story and set the stage for the
2007 legislative reforms. 19 1 The OFT report recommended a relaxation of
MDP restrictions (including the removal of a ban on fee sharing by
solicitors with other professionals) and announced a one-year time limit
within which the legal regulators (the Law Society and the Bar Council)
had to act or face the threat of fines or other sanctions. 192 The OFT
concluded that restrictions that barred MDPs were unreasonable market
restraints that gave rise to inflationary pricing and resulted in an
anticompetitive practice in the United Kingdom's main commercial
professions. The report concluded that legal-professional privilege was
anticompetitive, as it gave lawyers an unfair advantage over other
professional advisors. 193 The Director General of the OFT said that
intervention by the authority would be avoided, "provided [that] real
progress is made," and that the OFT would "take action after this grace
period if necessary, or earlier if there is no evidence of willingness to make
194
changes."'
The OFT action came after reform by the Law Society itself had been
proceeding at a glacial pace. In 1996, the Law Society had abandoned its
traditional opposition to MDPs; an October 1998 consultation paper,
"MDPs: Why?.. . Why Not?" considered different ways to facilitate MDPs
while maintaining adequate regulatory supervision. The Law Society
obliquely acknowledged political pressure to open the field to MDPs, with a
representative noting that part of the "Law Society's intention in continuing
to consult on the subject of multi-disciplinary practice is to be in a position
to avoid the imposition of what might be an unsatisfactory regime should
any part of Government decide to take action." 195 The Law Society finally
agreed to support MDPs in 1999. Its Council overwhelmingly approved a
statement from its MDP Working Party that "[t]he ultimate goal should be
to allow solicitors who wish to do so to provide any legal service through
any medium to anyone."' 196 In October 1999, the Law Society's Council
considered a Law Society Working Party report that proposed developing

191. U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING,

COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS

(2001).

192. See Claire Smith, The OFT Report: The Legal, LAWYER (London), Mar. 12, 2001,
http://www.thelawyer.com/the-oft-report-the-legal/77471.article; see also Jean Eaglesham,
Lawyers To Be Subject to Full Force of Competition Law, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 9,
2001, at 3; Jeremy Fleming, Society Primed To Launch Fresh Battle over MDPs, GAZETTE
(U.K.), Mar. 15, 2001, at 4.
193. U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 191, at 7, 11; see also Margetts, You
Don't Need a Weatherman, supra note 144, at 545-46.
194. Smith, supra note 192.
195. Alison Crawley, The Law Soc'y of Eng. & Wales, Solicitors, Accountants and
Multi-Disciplinary Practice: The English Perspective, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/
crawley.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
196. Neil Rose, Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships on Horizon After 'Seismic' Vote,
GAZETTE (U.K.), Oct. 20, 1999, at 3.
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two "interim models" to allow for MDPs without the need for legislation. 19 7
The first of these was called "legal practice plus" and would allow
nonsolicitor partners in a solicitors' firm, the main business of which must
be the provision of legal and ancillary services. 198 The Working Party,
however, stated that it did not "believe [that] this model is a complete
answer as it does not permit a one-stop-shop."' 199 The other option, labeled
"linked partnerships," built on the model in which an independent firm of
solicitors allied itself with another professional practice, such as a
partnership of accountants. 20 0 The Working Party was "willing to explore"
whether the ban on fee sharing between such linked partnerships was
necessary, and to explore passive investments in law firms, the extent of
conflicting duties between lawyers and others, and whether achieving the
long-term goals set out in its report would require a change in the legislative
20 1
framework by which the Law Society was governed.
A change in rules via "interim solution[s]" was approved in a November
2000 vote. 20 2 Nonsolicitors would become partners in a law firm, so long
as the firm's business remained the provision of legal and ancillary
services. 20 3 The Law Society Working Party proposed that services be
restricted to those "only of a kind [that] are normally provided by solicitors
practising as solicitors." 20 4 While it was acknowledged that this might
seem to be unduly restrictive, the scope of solicitors' services was already
broad, encompassing property selling, financial services, and general
consultancy. 20 5 The nonsolicitors would agree by contract to submit to the
Law Society's regulatory powers. 20 6 Ultimate control would remain with
solicitors. 20 7 Under the "linked partnership" model, law firms were
permitted to have fee-sharing agreements with other businesses. The
relationship with the linked business would have to be disclosed to
clients. 20 8 A December 2000 Law Society Working Group report favored

197. ALISON CRAWLEY, BRONWEN STILL & NICOLA TAYLOR, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES: PROPOSALS FOR THE WAY FORWARD: A PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR DEBATE
(1999).
198. Id. para. 22.
199. Id para. 22(1).
200. Id. para. 22(2).
201. Id. paras. 22-24.
202. See Law Society To Push MDPs Through Early, LAWYER (London), Nov. 13, 2000,
http://www.thelawyer.com/law-society-to-push-mdps-through-early/1 02942.article.
203. Id.
204. NICOLA TAYLOR, LAW SOC'Y OF ENG. & WALES, MULTI-DSCIPLINARY PRACTICE
WORKING PARTY THIRD INTERIM REPORT: LEGAL PRACTICE PLUS-A FIRST STEP TOWARDS

MDPs 7 (2000).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 4.
207. Id. at 5.
208. Neil Rose, Law Society Lays the Groundworkfor MDPs, GAZETrE (U.K.), July 13,
2000, at 4.
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allowing solicitors in this "linked partnership" model to share
fees with any
209
other business, with the proviso that solicitors retain control.
The Law Society viewed these two models only as "interim steps." A
report in the July 20, 2000, issue of the Law Society Gazette quoted the
chairman of the regulation review working party as saying that the
committee was looking beyond MDPs to what he called "'Virgin.com
solicitors.'. . . with commercial organisations, such as Virgin, owning their
law firms. '2 10 The Law Society's steps were particularly timely. A
FinancialTimes survey in September 1999 indicated that more than half of
British and American corporate purchasers of legal services were willing to
make use of firms that had both accountants and lawyers. 2 11 A survey
conducted somewhat later for the British publication Commercial Lawyer
concluded that a significant majority of corporate 2counsel
and finance
12
directors preferred traditional, single-source providers.
The U.K. was moving accordingly in a very different direction than that
taken by the ABA House of Delegates during the same period. The
adoption of a restrictive MDP model, however, would not satisfy
government regulators, particularly those in the Office of Fair Trading who
were pressing for far more substantial reforms. Divisions between
barristers and solicitors would in this case delay implementation. On July
30, 2002, the Lord Chancellor's Department issued a consultation document
on multidisciplinary partnerships that asked for views on MDPs. 2 13 The
Bar Council, representing barristers, had campaigned strenuously to
forestall permissive rules; the Law Society of England and Wales,
representing solicitors, continued to be "actively seeking the parliamentary
time" needed to implement a mixed-partnership model. 2 14 Consumer
interest, legal ethics, and government regulation animated a push in a
permissive direction, which presented a stark contrast to the Canadian and

209. TAYLOR, supra note 204, at 3. For a more detailed analysis of the two models and
the ethical ramifications of their operation, see Aubrey Meachum Connatser,
MultidisciplinaryPartnershipsin the United States and the United Kingdom and Their Effect
on InternationalBusiness Litigation, 36 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 365, 380-90 (2001).
210. Neil Rose, Multi-DisciplinaryPractices: Should the UK Follow the US's Lead?,
GAZETTE (U.K.), July 20, 2000, at 9.
211. See Chris Amheim, Why Most Clients Want a One-Stop Shop, TIMES (London), July

18, 2000, at 16.
212. See Jean Eaglesham & John Mason, Independent Spirit, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.

6, 2000, at 26 (reporting on the Commercial Lawyer magazine survey, noting that thirtyseven percent of FTSE 100 companies said they would consider using an MDP as their main
law firm, compared with sixty-six percent of businesses quoted on the smaller Alternative
Investment Market and fifty-six percent of businesses within the top 300 private companies).
213. U.K. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST? A CONSULTATION BY
THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT FOLLOWING THE OFT REPORT ON COMPETITION IN

PRO FESSIONS (2002), availableat http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/generalloftrept.htm.
214. Jean Eaglesham, Accountants Face Setback over Plans To Sell Legal Services, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 30, 2002, at 2.
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American approaches even though England
shares the same common-law
2 15
tradition and concerns about "core values."
That push culminated in legislation: the Legal Services Act, 2007,
implements a set of "radical reforms which will see services in the £20
billion legal sector undergo major changes to bring them in line with other
professional services in the 21st century. '2 16 Proclaimed into law on
October 30, 2007, the Act removed the authority of the traditional selfregulatory bodies for lawyers in England and implemented a regulatory
2 17
model and structures more closely tied to government.
There are four main components. First, the Act establishes a new Legal
Services Board (LSB) to serve as a "single, independent and publicly
accountable regulator with the power to enforce high standards in the legal
'218
sector, replacing the maze of regulators with overlapping powers.
Second, the Act simplifies a previously complex web of conduits for
consumer complaints and lawyer discipline, establishing a single and fully
independent Office for Legal Complaints (OLC) "to remove complaints
219
handling from the legal professions and restore consumer confidence."
Third, the Act provides specific authorization for the establishment of
alternative business structures (ABS) for the delivery of legal services by
lawyers and nonlawyers together, a radical shift and to a great degree an
220
amended version of the multidisciplinary practice model rejected.
Fourth, the Act articulates a set of "regulatory objectives" for the regulation
of legal services designed to guide all parts of the system.2 21 These last two
components are key to understanding the future of the MDP in England.
The "regulatory objectives" place consumer welfare and the public
interest as preeminent concerns in the first section of the Act, as follows:
(1) In this Act a reference to "the regulatory objectives" is a reference to
the objectives ofa) protecting and promoting the public interest;
215. As in North America, the most strident opposition to MDPs in England came from
litigators. Since the English system is bifurcated into barristers and solicitors, the response
of the Bar Council to the Office of Fair Trading demand was significant both in respect of
MDP matters generally and because of intraprofessional concerns: prior to the 2007
reforms, the Law Society feared that the English barristers would hold themselves out as the
only independent Bar in England should MDPs proceed. The Bar Council strenuously
opposed partnerships among barristers and nonlawyers as posing insurmountable conflict of
interest problems and limiting consumer choice in advocacy. See Connatser, supra note 209,
at 384.
216. Press Release, Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Act Given Royal Assent (Oct. 30,
2007), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease30l007a.htm; see also Legal Services
Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.); Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Act 2007,
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/legalservicesbill.htm

(last visited Mar. 19, 2010)

(assessing the regulatory impact of the law).
217. For a detailed history of the events leading up to the adoption of the 2007 legislation,
see Paton, supra note 13, at 96-104.
218. Press Release, Ministry of Justice, supra note 216.
219. Id.
220. See Maute, Revolutionary Changes, supra note 15, at 11-12.

221. Legal Services Act, c. 29, pt. 1.
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b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law;
c) improving access to justice;
d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers;
e) promoting competition in the provision of services...;
f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal
profession;
g) increasing public understanding of the citizen's legal rights and duties;
h) promoting and maintaining adherence
to the professional principles
222
[defined in section 1(3) of the Act].
The direction of the legislation came directly from a process begun in
July 2003, with Secretary of State Lord Falconer appointing Sir David
Clementi to conduct an independent review of the regulatory framework of
the legal profession in the U.K. The Terms of Reference required Clementi
to report by December 31, 2004, and
[t]o consider what regulatory framework would best promote competition,
innovation and the public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective
and independent legal sector.
To recommend a framework which will be independent in representing
the public and consumer interest, comprehensive, accountable, consistent,
flexible, transparent,
and no more restrictive or burdensome than is
223
clearly justified.
As John Flood has noted, "[t]hese innocuous terms of reference gave rise to
one of the most far-reaching analyses and set of proposals for reforming the
legal profession that the UK, or indeed, the world, has seen. '224 In
announcing the Clementi review, Lord Falconer also announced that the
government favored "'allowing new types of businesses such as multidisciplinary practices giving "one stop" services and corporations wider
access to the market but will leave it to the review to recommend how best
to regulate them to safeguard the independence of the professions and
consumers' interests."' 225 Accordingly, Clementi had the task of assessing
the implementation of alternative business structures through which legal
services could be delivered: the question was no longer "whether," but
"how."22 6
Clementi's March 2004 consultation paper confirmed this shift towards
viewing reforms from a consumer welfare perspective and the need for
significant change in regulatory direction to prioritize those interests. While

222. Id.
223. See SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT 1 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
224. Flood, supra note 15, at 4.
225. See Paton, supra note 13, at 100 (quoting Press Release, Dep't of Constitutional
Affairs (U.K.), Wide-Ranging Review Aims To Open Up Competition (July 24, 2003)).
226. See the discussion of the Clementi Review in LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, supra note

12, at 7; Flood, supra note 15, at 6-8; and Paton, supra note 13, at 100-04.
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indicating that he was sensitive to arguments by the legal profession that the
"core values" of the profession were unique and that legal services
provision should not be treated simply as a service offering like those of
any other industry, 22 7 the paper nevertheless focused on five key issues that
all had an underlying consumer or public interest focus: complaints
handling and discipline, unregulated legal service providers, new business
structures for
legal services provision, and professionalism and self22 8
regulation.
Clementi asked for responses on a variety of questions that dealt with the
combination or separation of representative from regulatory functions;
delegation of powers from government to a new regulator; the constitution
of and appointments process for the Board of a new regulator; and other
229
accountability mechanisms.
The impact of globalization was a particular concern, both in respect of
marketplace competition and in ensuring that domestic regulatory regimes
were in harmony with international obligations, including General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) requirements. The Report noted,
The regulatory framework for legal services in England and Wales
should, amongst other benefits, enable providers to compete effectively in
the modem domestic and rapidly expanding global marketplace. To that
end, any changes to the regulatory framework must not be
counterproductive in terms of inhibiting the competitiveness of legal
service providers in England and Wales. The revised framework must
also take 230
full account of the impact of the UK's international
obligations.
GATS requirements included direction that "domestic regulation should be
based on objective and transparent criteria, not more burdensome than
necessary and, in relation to licensing procedures, not in themselves a
23 1
restriction on the supply of the service."
Two hundred and sixty-five responses broadly supported in principle some
232
sort of regulatory reform.
Clementi's Final Report, published in December 2004, concluded that the
current system gave insufficient regard to the needs of the consumer, that
the structures of the main professional bodies were inappropriate for their
regulatory tasks, that oversight regulatory arrangements for professional
bodies were overly complex and inconsistent, and that while no clear
objectives or principles could be discerned as underlying the existing
regulatory system, such objectives did indeed exist and needed to be more
227. SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A CONSULTATION PAPER 2,14-23 (2004).

228. Id. at 1. See also the helpful summary in Maute, Revolutionary Changes, supra note
15, at 9-10.
229. CLEMENTI, supra note 227, at 32, 34-35, 51-53 (Questions B1-B6, D2-D4).
230. See id. at 34.
231. See id. at 34-35; see also Paul D. Paton, Legal Services and the GATS: Norms as
Barriersto Trade, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 361 (2003); Terry, supra note 3.
232. CLEMENTI, supra note 223, at 12, app. 1.
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clearly articulated. 233 Clementi also found that the complaints system was
inefficient and had failed to secure consumer confidence. 234
He
recommended the creation of a Legal Services Board into which
government would vest all regulatory powers. 235 The LSB would then
delegate front-line regulatory functions to recognized professional bodies as
long as they handled their responsibilities appropriately and separated their
regulatory from their representative functions. 236 He also recommended the
establishment of an Office for Legal Complaints to serve as a single source
body for handling all consumer complaints against legal services
providers. 237 The OLC would be under the authority and general
2 38
supervision of the LSB, but would handle complaints independently.
The sixth and final chapter of the Final Report, entitled "Alternative
Business Structures" offered extensive commentary about and
recommendations for implementing forms of legal services delivery beyond
the traditional law firm model. 239

Clementi provided a scheme for

immediate implementation of Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDPs), which
would bring together barristers, solicitors, conveyancers, and other legal
professionals to offer legal services to third parties. Accountants, human
resources professionals, and others could support the delivery of legal
services but not provide services directly to clients. Nonlawyers could be
managers but not partners in LDPs. 240 This commingling of legal services
providers constituted a shift in approach in England and a major breaking
down of traditional barriers to consumer access to legal services. The more
difficult question, about Multi-Disciplinary Practices, or fully integrated
professional services offerings, was left open: Clementi wrote that MDPs
could be potentially viable "if at some subsequent juncture the regulatory
24 1
authorities considered that sufficient safeguards could be put in place."
From the December 2004 tabling of his report, it was another year and a
half until legislation was introduced in the House of Commons as a draft
Legal Services Bill in May 2006. The final version did not receive Royal
Assent until the end of October 2007, after a tortuous path through both the
House of Commons and the House of Lords. 242 This was despite the fact
that the government broadly accepted Clementi's recommendations and
incorporated a number of amendments into a prior version of a draft bill

233. Id. at 2, 14-23.
234. Id.
235. Id.at 8.
236. Id. at 49-50.
237. Id.at 66-67.
238. Id. at 51-80.
239. Id.at 9, 105-39.
240. Id. at 108-32.
241. Id. at 139.
242. The history of the debate and all amendments is set out on the UK Parliament
website at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills/200607/legalservices.htm

(last

visited Mar. 19, 2010). A prior version was introduced in the House of Lords in November
2006.
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prior to first introducing it in the House of Lords. 243 The Act established
the Legal Services Board as the front-line regulator, generally following the
path laid out in the original Office of Fair Trading and Clementi Review
recommendations.
IOn MDPs, however, the Act did not require the two-stage
process of
LDP before MDP that Clementi had recommended; as long as a new
structure for the delivery of legal services obtained a license from the new
regulator, it could operate. 244 The manner in which the new regulator will
grant such licenses is under deliberation, and the Legal Services Board is
committed to granting the first "alternative business structures" licenses by
2011.245 The LSB has noted that a "shift in focus is required, from
regulating the conduct of individual lawyers, towards regulation of the
entity providing legal services. ' 246 A discussion paper seeking input on
how best to implement the new regulatory scheme made clear that the
debate about whether to open up the market was settled; the task is to sort
out when and how the market will be opened, and to analyze how new types
of legal services providers should be regulated.2 4 7 The discussion paper
makes specific reference to changes already implemented in Australia, and
the possibility that English approaches may be guided by the answers to
"core values" questions addressed by Australia in permitting law firm
incorporations, multidisciplinary practices, and nonlawyer investor
ownership of law firms.2 4 8 By 2011, the MDP will be in place in England,
and American law firms competing in the global financial services
marketplace, in particular, will have to assess a new threat: a regulatory
landscape that will give law firms in London "individually, and the English
legal profession collectively, a hitherto unimaginable competitive
advantage." 249
IX. AUSTRALIA

The English Legal Services Board is looking to Australia for directions
on how to implement a regulatory framework for "alternative business
structures" for good reason.
Over the last decade, Australia has
aggressively opened its domestic legal market to incorporated legal
243. See the detailed discussion in Maute, Revolutionary Changes, supra note 15, at 1213.

244. LEGAL SERVS. BD., supra note 12, at 9-10.
245. Id. at 4, 12-15.
246. Id. at 5.
247. Id. at 4.
248. Id. at 30; see also Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, New South Wales,
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/llolsc.nsf/pages/OLSC-index
(last visited
Mar. 19, 2010).
249. Davis, supra note 133, at 9. In their 2009 articles, both Anthony Davis and John
Flood have used transaction-focused MDPs as illustrations of a serious competitive threat to
U.S. law firms. See id. at 8-9; Flood, supra note 15, at 10 (considering the potential impact
of an investment firm buying a large international law firm to offer a "total M&A package at
rates that would not depend on variable professional fees but straightforward value billing
instead").
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practices, multidisciplinary practices, and nonlawyer investment in law firm
250
entities, including the first initial public offering of shares in a law firm.
This has coincided with the effective end of self-regulation by the legal
profession, replaced by a coregulatory system that separates regulatory from
representative functions, and legislation that places increased responsibility
in the hands of government or government agencies. While regulations
vary from state to state, incorporated legal practices are permitted under
national model laws, as well as in New South Wales, the Northern
Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia. 25 1 National Model Laws
developed in 2002 permitted alternative business structures, amongst other
matters; the Model Laws were not intended to replace existing state
regulatory structures but instead to set standards that existing state
structures could aspire to meet. 2 52 Three Australian states 253
released
legislation aimed at implementing the Model Laws soon thereafter.
Pressure for increased liberalization now comes from the profession
itself. In a September 2009 speech, the President of the Law Council of
Australia noted that the Council had welcomed the Australian
Government's announcement earlier in 2009 that the Council of Australian
Governments would add legal profession reform to Australia's
microeconomic reform agenda. Uniform legislation and an integrated
regulatory framework are being sought to "move towards a more functional
and efficient Australian legal services market. ' 254 But domestic growth
250. See the discussion of Australian regulatory changes in SLATER & GORDON LIMITED,
PROSPECTUS (2000); Grech & Morrison, supra note 13; Parker, Law Firms Incorporated,
supra note 13 (discussing MDPs and ILPs in Australia); Paton, supra note 13, at 104-07;
and Parker, Peering Over the Ethical Precipice, supra note 13, at 3 (analyzing the
implications of the incorporation and listing on the Australian Securities Exchange of Slater
& Gordon, the "first law firm in the world to list").
251. Parker, Law Firms Incorporated,supra note 13, at 1 & n.1;Reid Mortensen & Linda
Haller, Legal Profession Reform in Queensland,23 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 280 (2004).
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conjunction with the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG)
culminating in the public release of the second edition Legal Profession Model Bill
late in 2006. Between 2004 and 2008 the States and territories (apart from South
Australia) enacted a Legal Profession Act based on the template of the model
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(last visited
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MODEL BILL (MODEL PROVISIONS) (2d ed. 2007); STANDING COMM. OF ATTORNEYS-GEN.,
LEGAL PROFESSION-MODEL LAWS PROJECT: MODEL REGULATIONS (2d ed. 2007); Linda

Hailer, Imperfect PracticeUnder the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), 23 U. QUEENSL. L.J.
411 (2004).
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itself is not the end goal, as legal services are seen as making an enormous
contribution to Australia's economy "in both a national and international
sense." 2 55 Internationalization of legal services is seen as driving growth
for the Australian legal profession, particularly in Asian markets, China,
and Hong Kong. The Law Council's "International Strategy" is focused on
"developing mutual understanding and trust with overseas counterparts and
working with counterpart bodies to foster hospitable reciprocal conditions
for the practice of foreign law." 2 56 Just as U.S. firms will need to be
concerned about competitive threats posed by U.K. firms, Australia is
aggressively investigating how regulatory frameworks can further be
adjusted to ensure that Australian lawyers are poised to compete both from
domestic bases and abroad. The fact that the profession is working with
government to ensure that ethical considerations are addressed within these
new regulatory frameworks is evidence that the simple adoption of an
alternative approach to the delivery mode for legal services does not alone
mean the abandonment of "core values," as the MDP debate in North
America ten years ago suggested.
X. LESSONS FROM THE

MDP DEBATE, AND THE WAY FORWARD

As the Ethics 20/20 Commission deeply engages the challenges emerging
from globalization of the profession, it will have to squarely address not
whether, but how, alternative business structures like the multidisciplinary
practice will be part of the American regulatory landscape in the future.
The English and Australian experiences, in particular, demonstrate that
thinking about the profession as a business does not have to mean the
abandonment of "core values" as the profession evolves. Rather, the
challenge is to ensure that the dialogue and debate is broad ranging, not
beholden to a politically powerful segment or segments of the bar, and that
consumer interests are kept front and center.
This will require a different sort of debate than what went on in North
America roughly a decade ago. Yet at both the ABA and at the CBA,
Commissions charged with deep study recommended fundamental change;
the failure to act came when the issue came to a vote and "core values"
rhetoric was invoked to sustain the status quo. Even regulators in Canada
and those responsible for regulating the profession in the United States in
the public interest demonstrated greater fealty to guild protection. In that
respect, "core values" was used as a "veto over change." 25 7 This time,
however, the opportunities presented by alternative business structures such
as the MDP, and the economic threats coming not from accounting firms
but from globalization of legal services and law firms in England and
Australia means that the subtext-and likely the outcome-will be
different. Further, from an access to justice perspective, permitting
255. Id.
256. Id. at 9.
257. See Crystal, supra note 24, at 774.
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alternative delivery structures such as MDPs will have a far broader impact
on ordinary citizens' ability to purchase legal services than the Big Five
accounting firm initiatives about which the ABA, CBA, and regulators were
so concerned a decade ago. 2 58 There is also a greater risk if the bar fails to
appropriately and credibly consider the public interest in assessing the
merits of MDPs and to act accordingly: attracting a legislative response
that not only implements rules with which the profession itself is not
satisfied, but using that to justify further encroachments on lawyer selfregulation. In the aftermath of Enron, Congress demonstrated that it was
prepared to legislate rules for lawyers appearing before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, despite fierce resistance from the ABA. 259 The
fundamental transformation of regulation in England resulted when the
profession was moving towards action, just not quickly or dramatically
enough.
Getting across the threshold of accepting change, not just "peering over
the ethical precipice" 260 can then lead to a deeper engagement of how to
reconcile traditional "core values" questions with new models of service
delivery. Thinking about how to regulate the firm rather than just the
individual lawyers practicing within it, for example, will require a paradigm
shift, but the foundation for that was laid in the United States nearly twenty
years ago. 26 1 Current economic challenges and the changed global legal
258. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law:
Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 961, 963-66 (2002); see also BOYD,
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141-53.
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rejection, twice, of the recommendation of its Ethics 2000 Commission to amend the Model
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and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era, 84 CANADIAN B. REV. 533 (2006). The SEC adopted
final rules implementing section 307 on January 23, 2003, and released the text of the rules
the following week. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rules Under
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm. For final
rule text, see Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina
J. Johnson, Managerialism,Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 299; Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004); Sung Hui Kim, The
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Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 947 (2005).
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261. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm
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Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure'"of
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environment present the opportunity for the profession in North America to
once again consider the MDP, economic self-interests of the profession, a
consumer welfare perspective, and how these forces might align.
Reviewing the lessons from the previous MDP debate is a place to start.
Reaffirming that lawyers' ethical identities and professional values
transcend models of business delivery, and ensuring that both the profession
and the public recognize that in an era of increased globalization, is a
daunting task but one that will be fundamental to both this next MDP
debate, and the future of the profession as a whole.

the opportunity to develop new models for ethical practice and internalization of
responsibility for ethical conduct).

